# 1AC

## 1AC---DPS


### 1AC---Socialism

#### The advantage is Socialism:


#### Marx’s law of profitability explains cyclical recessions and renders capitalism unsustainable


Roberts 15 - London economist (Michael, https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/12/29/the-marxist-theory-of-economic-crises-in-capitalism-part-two/, emuse)

Does Marx’s law fit the facts? Some Marxist critics of Marx’s law of profitability reckon that the law cannot be empirically proven or refuted because official statistics cannot be used to show Marx’s law in operation. But there are plenty of studies by Marxist economists that show otherwise. The key tests of the validity of the law in modern capitalist economies would be to show whether 1) the rate of profit falls over time as the organic composition of capital rises; 2) the rate of profit rises when the organic composition falls or when the rate of surplus value rises faster than the organic composition of capital; 3) the rate of profit rises, if there is sharp fall in the organic composition of capital as in a slump. These would be the empirical tests and there is plenty of empirical evidence for the US and world economy to show that the answer is yes to all these questions. For example, [Basu and Manolakos](http://gesd.free.fr/basumano.pdf) applied econometric analysis to the US economy between 1948 and 2007 and found that there was a secular tendency for the rate of profit to fall with a measurable decline of about 0.3 percent a year “after controlling for counter-tendencies.” In [my work on the US rate of profit,](http://gesd.free.fr/mr1213.pdf) I also found an average decline of 0.4 percent a year through 2009. And here is a figure by G Carchedi for the rise in the organic composition of capital (OCC) in the industrial sector of the US since 1947 versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V) versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V)


[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/arp.png)

There is a clear inverse correlation between a rising organic composition of capital and a falling rate of profit. Can Marx’s law explain crises? How does Marx’s law of profitability work as an explanation and forecast of slumps in capitalist economies? The law leads to a clear causal connection to regular and recurrent crises (slumps). It runs from falling profitability to falling profits to falling investment to falling employment and incomes. A bottom is reached when there is sufficient destruction of capital values (the writing off technology, the bankruptcy of companies, a reduction in wage costs) to raise profits and then profitability. Then rising profitability leads to rising investment again. The cycle of boom recommences and the whole ‘crap’ starts again, to use Marx’s colourful phrase. [There is a cycle of profit alongside the long-term tendency for the rate of profit to fall.](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/cycles-in-capitalism.pdf)

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profit-cycle.png) The evidence of this causality between profit and investment is available. Jose Tapia Granados, using regression analysis, finds that, over 251 quarters of US economic activity from 1947, profits started declining long before investment did and that pre-tax profits can explain 44% of all movement in investment, while there is no evidence that investment can explain any movement in profits. I find a higher ‘Granger causality’ of 60% from annual changes in profit and investment (unpublished) and a correlation of 0.67 for the period since 2000. And see this by G Carchedi ([Carchedi Presentation](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/carchedi-presentation.pptx)). In the period leading up to the Great Recession 2008-9, we can see the causality visually for US profits, investment and real GDP in the graphic below. The mass of US corporate profit peaks in mid-2006, investment and GDP follows two years later. Profits turn back up in late 2008 and investment follows one year later.

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profits-lead.png)

There are two basic regularities shown by the data: that a change in profits tends to be followed next year by a change in investment in the same direction; and that a change in investment is usually followed in a few years by changes in profits in the opposite direction. Thus we have a cycle. From these results, the “regularity” of the business cycle, and the fact that profitability stagnated in 2013 and declined in 2014 (and now the mass of profits in 2015) after growing between 2008 and 2012, it can be concluded with some confidence that a recession of the US economy, which will be also part of a world economic crisis like the Great Recession, will occur again in the next few years. And Marx’s law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall makes an even more fundamental prediction: that the capitalist mode of production will not be eternal, that it is transitory in the history of human social organisation. The law of the tendency predicts that, over time, there will be a fall in the rate of profit globally, delivering more crises of a devastating character. Work has been done by modern Marxist analysis that confirms that the world rate of profit has fallen over the last 150 years. See the graph below ([data from Esteban Maito](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/maito-esteban-the-historical-transience-of-capital-the-downward-tren-in-the-rate-of-profit-since-xix-century.pdfhttp:/gesd.free.fr/mrwrate.pdf) and ‘doctored’ by me).

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/world-rate-of-profit-maito.png) Maito’s data for the 19th century have recently been questioned ([DUMENIL-LEVY on MAITO](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/dumenil-levy-on-maito.pdf)), but in a recent work using different sources and countries, I find a similar trend for the post-1945 period globally ([Revisiting a world rate of profit June 2015](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/revisiting-a-world-rate-of-profit-june-2015.pdf)). And earlier groundbreaking work by Minqi Li and colleagues, as well as by Dave Zachariah, show a similar trend. As Maito concludes: “The tendency of the rate of profit to fall and its empirical confirmation highlights the historically limited nature of capitalist production. If the rate of profit measures the vitality of the capitalist system, the logical conclusion is that it is getting closer to its endpoint. There are many ways that capital can attempt to overcome crises and regenerate constantly. Periodic crises are specific to the capitalist mode of production and allow, ultimately, a partial recovery of profitability. This is a characteristic aspect of capital and the cyclical nature of the capitalist economy. But the periodic nature of these crises has not stopped the downward trend of the rate of profit over the long term. So the arguments claiming that there is an inexhaustible capacity of capital to restore the rate of profit and its own vitality and which therefore considers the capitalist mode of production as a natural and a-historical phenomenon, are refuted by the empirical evidence.” So the law predicts that, as the organic composition of capital rises globally, the rate of profit will fall despite counteracting factors and despite successive crises (which temporarily help to restore profitability). This shows that capital as a mode of production and social relations is transient. Capitalism has not always been here and it has ultimate limits, namely capital itself. It has a ‘use-by-date’. That is the essence of the law of profitability for Marx. Alternative theories This is not to deny other factors in capitalist crises. The role of credit is an important part of Marxist crisis theory and indeed, as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall engenders countertendencies, one of increasing importance is the expansion of credit and the switching of surplus value into investment in fictitious capital rather than productive capital to raise profitability temporarily, but with eventually disastrous consequences, as The Great Recession shows ([The Great Recession](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/the-great-recession.pdf); [Debt matters](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/debt-matters.pdf)). Alternative theories of crisis like underconsumption, or the lack of effective demand, are taken from theories from the reactionary Thomas Malthus and the radical Sismondi in the early 19th century and then taken up by Keynes in the 1930s and by modern inequality theorists like Stiglitz and [post-Keynesian economists](http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=15854). But lack of demand and rising inequality cannot explain the regularity of crises or predict the next one. These theories do not have strong empirical backing either ([Does inequality causes crises](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/does-inequality-causes-crises.pdf)). Professor Heinrich, after concluding that Marx did not have a theory of crisis and dropped the law of profitability, [does offer a vague one of his own](https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/05/19/the-two-michaels-heinrich-and-roberts-in-berlin-dogmatism-versus-doubt/): namely capital accumulates and produces more means of production blindly. This gets out of line with consumption demand from workers. So a ‘gap’ develops that has to be filled by credit, but somehow this cannot hold up things indefinitely and production then collapses. Well, it is a sort of a theory, but pretty much the same as the underconsumption (overproduction) theory that Heinrich himself dismisses and [Marx dismissed 150 years ago.](http://www.mcg-j.org/swp_arc/english/etheory/economics/eprm29-2.htm) It seems way less convincing or empirically supported that Marx’s own theory of crisis based on the law of profitability. No other theory, whether from mainstream economics or from heterodox economics, can explain recurrent and regular crises and offer a clear objective foundation for the transience of the capitalist system.

#### Mounting dysfunction drives imperialism and inter-capitalist competition---risks nuclear war

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.amazon.com/Socialism-Extinction-Automation-Capitalist-Breakdown-ebook/dp/B081FHF2ZQ>, emuse)

We have seen that the crisis is intensifying competition between the major imperialist and capitalist powers. The counter-tendencies have failed to prevent the onset of the next crisis. An even greater devaluation of capital and labour power is required. The death and destruction wrought by war is the ultimate source of devaluation and therefore the most important counter-tendency. If war wasn’t an inevitability under capitalism, militarism would be done away with since it is funded through taxation that could otherwise be put towards productive capital. Many Marxists have failed to grasp this. Luxemburg, for example, claimed that “from the purely economic point of view, militarism is a pre-eminent means for the realisation of surplus-value; it is in itself a sphere of accumulation”.[496] Again, her analysis was based on circulation, not production. Grossman counters that “this is how things may appear from the standpoint of individual capital as military supplies have always been the occasion for rapid enrichment. But from the standpoint of the total capital, militarism is a sphere of unproductive consumption. Instead of being saved, values are pulverised. Far from being a sphere of accumulation, militarism slows down accumulation. By means of indirect taxation a major share of the income of the working class which might have gone into the hands of the capitalists as surplus value is seized by the state and spent mainly for unproductive purposes.” On the other hand, though, apart from natural resources, the main resource the capitalists are fighting over in a war is human labour, enough of which is not available at home. What better way to decimate the wages of this new source of surplus value than through warfare? And as well as the destruction of capital value, innovation is accelerated by the arms race, leading to new use-values for the post- war civilian economy and furthering devaluation. Idealists claimed the fall of the Soviet Union would bring about a new era of world peace. The destruction of Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Syria and Yemen since then shows both that they did not appreciate the nature of imperialism or the protection the Soviet Union afforded to countries threatened by imperialism. Who is next for daring to seek independence? Venezuela? Iran? Russia and China have been encircled by NATO in the biggest build- up of military forces since the Second World War. As the crisis of accumulation deepens, the size and frequency of wars tend to grow. In the wake of 9/11, the author Zoltan Grossman circulated a list, based on Congressional Records and The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, of 133 US military interventions from 1890 to 2001. The average per year is 1.15 before, and 1.29 after, the Second World War. After the Cold War, from late 1989, the figure rises to 2.0. The Democrat Barack Obama replaced the gung-ho Republican warmonger George W Bush in 2008 promising ‘hope’ and ‘change’. But by the end of his second term in 2016, US special operators could be found in 70% – 138 – of the world’s nations, a huge jump of 130% since Bush left office. In 2016 alone, the Obama administration sanctioned the use of at least 26,171 bombs. “This means that every day last year, the US military blasted combatants or civilians overseas with 72 bombs; that’s three bombs every hour, 24 hours a day,” Medea Benjamin of the anti-war CodePink wrote in The Guardian.[500] In 2017, Trump – who in his April 2016 foreign policy speech said that “war and aggression will not be my first instinct” because he wanted to spend the money instead domestically to ‘make America great again’ – outstripped Obama’s 2016 figure by 9,000. Given that many of these wars are fought in an alliance of the imperialist powers, mainly through NATO, much analysis on the Left makes the mistake of thinking that inter-imperialist rivalry no longer exists. This follows on from Kautsky who, because he did not see war as arising from economic necessity, came up with a theory of “ultra- imperialism” whereby the imperialists would realise that it was not in their interests to continue the First World War and would therefore unite to “peaceably redivide the world". Something like this – to a limited extent – did temporarily emerge, but only after the Second World War, only in collective opposition to the Soviet Union, and during a period in which capitalism was recovering in the wake of the war’s devaluation of capital, meaning competition had temporarily diminished. But the barbaric aggression of the wars on the Middle East is symptomatic of deepening capitalist crisis and intensifying rivalry. Through their opposition to the 2003 war on Iraq, France and Germany showed that they are not subordinate to US interests. In the 1990s, TotalFinaElf, France’s huge oil firm, secured the contract to develop Iraq’s southern Majnoon and Nahr Umar oil fields, containing as much as 25% of the country's reserves. German firms were the market leaders in supplying sensitive dual-use technology to Iraq in the years before the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and they had been bidding for more civilian commercial contracts. Khidir Hamza, an Iraqi defector, called Germany “the hub of Iraq's military purchases in the 1980s”. France and Germany did not want new competition. Between the start of 2002 to March 2003 the dollar fell by 20% against the euro. The US had to respond to this: its international economic domination is bound up with the dollar’s strength as the world’s currency anchor. The dollar’s dominance as the main currency for foreign exchange enables it to blackmail countries that do not yield to its demands. Ultimately, the strength of a currency reflects the productivity and size of the economy behind it. Trump’s administration has claimed that Germany is using its currency to “exploit” both its neighbours and the US, sparking fears of a currency war. The US made the desperate accusation that Germany is “under-consuming” goods and services from other countries. At the 2010 G20 summit in Seoul, the US made an unsuccessful attempt to limit the size of current account surpluses to 4% of GDP. Germany’s surplus overtook China’s in absolute size in 2017 and as a share of GDP became much larger. The IMF put Germany’s 2017 surplus as 8.1% of GDP and China’s at 1.6%. The EU’s surplus as a whole in 2017 was $387.1bn. In contrast, the US current account deficit was $462bn in 2017, bigger only than Britain’s $91.4bn. The deficit was 2.5% of GDP in the first quarter, up from 2.4% in the fourth quarter. Bush warned that the US would “neither forgive nor forget” if France continued to oppose the war on Iraq. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld accused Austria of blocking US troop movements from Germany to Italy and said the US was considering bringing home 100,000 troops stationed in Europe (70,000 in Germany) or relocating them to Eastern Europe. He threatened sanctions for “one reason only: to harm the German economy”. At the time, the US controlled 31.5% of world output to the EU’s 26%. However in 2004 ten additional countries were scheduled to join the 15 EU member states, a combination that would match the size of the US’s economy and exceed its population. FRFI – one of the few left-wing publications in Britain to anticipate the potential for conflict between the US and EU – reported in 2003 that total EU FDI already amounted to 52.5% of the world total, nearly 2.5 times that of the US. Over the period 1980-2001, the US share of the global total has halved. The massive rise in the US’s military spending has been necessitated by the need to reverse the decline of its economic dominance – to reiterate, if it doesn’t reverse this it won’t be able to valorise its capital. The Department of Defense’s base budget grew by 31% between 2000 and 2014. An $82bn hike to $716bn in 2018 represented an increase that by itself was larger than the entire defence budget of every country on earth, save China. Trump called the Defense Department’s annual budget “crazy” and proposed a 5% cut, but then committed to a $750bn budget for 2019. Who is really in charge? US military spending is at least 10 times the size of Russia’s, and four times the size of China’s. This is the same Department of Defense with a serious existing accounting problem. In 2016, before Trump was elected, the department’s Inspector General said he could not properly track $6.5 trillion in defence spending. An academic study looking at the years 1998-2015 later put the figure at $21 trillion. Clearly this is unsustainable. As Engels says, “the triumph of force is based on the production of arms, and this in turn on production in general”. US manufacturing output in the 1960s, at the time of the Vietnam War, constituted 27% of the economy and provided 24% of employment. In 2003 manufacturing amounted to 13.8% of its GDP, falling to 12.5% in 2015, and 10.5% of employment, falling to 8.8% in 2013. The US industrial base is shrinking and with it the manufacturing and engineering capacity to achieve military domination of the world. In November 2004 Le Monde Diplomatique reported that, “Some new (EU) states are large arms producers and exporters. The EU is now home to more than 400 companies in 23 countries manufacturing small arms and light weapons – hardly less than the US.” China’s manufacturing sector is now almost as large as those of the US, Japan and Germany combined. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003 its military expenditure was almost $400bn; Iraq’s was $1.4bn, 0.35% of the US’s. In violation of the Iraqi constitution and international law the US-UK Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) “laid off hundreds of thousands of Iraqi workers, virtually eliminated trade tariffs and enacted laws that radically alter Iraq’s economy. Order 39, decreed by CPA head Paul Bremer on September 20 2003, abolished Iraq's ban on foreign investment, allowing foreigners to own up to 100% of all sectors except natural resources. Over 200 state-owned enterprises, including electricity, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals have been privatised. Iraq's highest tax rate has been lowered from 45% to a flat rate of 15%. Although foreign ownership of land remains illegal, companies or individuals will be allowed to lease properties for up to 40 years.” The extraction of Iraq’s oil was also illegal. In 2011 government documents leaked to The Independent revealed that in November 2002, five months before the invasion, the UK Foreign Office invited BP to talks about opportunities in Iraq “post regime change”. Labour’s Baroness Symons, the then Trade Minister, promised BP that she would lobby the Bush administration because the oil giant feared it was being “locked out” of deals that Washington was quietly negotiating with the French and Russian governments and their energy firms. Control over territory, oil and oil transhipment routes is of paramount importance. With around 60% of the world’s oil reserves, the Middle East has been the key battleground. But this rivalry is playing out all over the world, in South America, Asia, Africa and, since the fall of the USSR, central and eastern Europe, which was identified by the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 as “a stable and promising region for FDI”. China, whose contribution to global GDP was expected to eclipse that of the US in 2018, is a particular concern to the traditional powers because its strategy of offering low- or even interest-free loans in exchange for fixed-price sales of primary commodities makes it a more attractive business partner to underdeveloped countries who have been bled dry by high interest loans from the IMF. The US only has intimidation and force left to offer in response. In 2008, for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reached a deal with China for roads, railways, clinics, hospitals, schools and two new universities worth $6bn. In exchange, China was given the right to extract 12 million tonnes of copper and cobalt over 25 years. In 2004, when Angola was reluctant to accept the terms of an IMF loan, China stepped in with a no-strings-attached $2bn. An Angolan minister said relations with China “not only allowed us to obtain large loans, but most importantly it forced the West to treat us with more respect”. China has overtaken Britain, France and the US as a trading partner with Africa. In 2017, China’s trade with Africa was worth $170bn, four-times larger than US-Africa trade. China invested $125bn in Africa in the decade to 2016 and committed to $60bn more over the next three years. In 2017 China’s trade with Latin America reached $244bn, again exceeding that of the US. China’s dominance in manufacturing has forced Latin American countries to deindustrialise somewhat and focus on producing primary commodities; but China’s investments have also had the effect of strengthening their currencies relative to the dollar. In July 2016, the RAND Corporation think tank warned that, whereas the US would have been capable of achieving a quick and decisive victory with minimal losses in a war with China in 2015, China’s improving anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities meant that a war in 2025 would instead be “prolonged and destructive, yet inconclusive”. The earlier part of that prediction seemed optimistic, given that the US became bogged down in the face of resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan for years when it expected quick, decisive victories in both, against forces inferior to China’s. Indeed, in March 2019 a RAND analyst said that its war game simulations showed that “when we fight Russia and China, blue gets its ass handed to it”. He said it would cost an extra $24bn a year to turn things around. Chinese and Russian opposition to US deployments of anti-missile systems in Asia has resulted in their greater military cooperation. However, Russia is using its position in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to try and contain Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia, where it has regional ambitions of its own. As Trevor Rayne wrote in FRFI: “The US turns to alliances with Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia to confront China, but China offers them investments and better trade deals. If it has to the US ruling class will resort to military force to prevent China ejecting it from its dominant position in the world. Competition between the imperialist powers may be limited to geopolitical manoeuvring, ideological and cyber warfare and negotiation table diplomacy for now, but that cannot last forever. At some point the capitalist crisis will become so deep that the imperialist powers will be forced into direct confrontation with each other. The overaccumulation of capital will have become so great that the only way to sufficiently devalue capital and labour power will be through global conflagration. This tendency expresses itself in increasing competition between the imperialist powers as they vie to attain dominance – that is, to apportion losses to one another, to seize each other’s capital and resources by any means. This is what happened in the 20th century. Two world wars, the Great Depression and fascism were the counter-tendencies and crisis measures required over a span of 41 years to keep the accumulation process going and eventually revive it to a healthy enough level to restore political stability. Kautsky – because he believed accumulation was harmonious – claimed that absolute capitalist breakdown would be brought about inevitably by world war, which in his view would happen only because of uncivilised ruling classes.[513] On the other side of the same coin, Bukharin and Varga believed the Second World War would bring about the completion of the world revolution. This perhaps partly explains some of the controversial decisions taken by the Communist International after 1929, when it effectively ordered its national sections in Europe to take social democratic routes to socialism.[514] Grossman says: “It would be useless to search Bukharin for any other cause of the breakdown of capitalism than the ravages created by war.... If like Bukharin, we expect the breakdown of capitalism to flow from a second round of imperialist wars, then it is necessary to point out that wars are not peculiar to the imperialist stage of capitalism. They stem from the essence of capitalism as such, during all its stages, and have been a constant symptom of capital since its historical inception.... far from being a threat to capitalism, wars are a means of prolonging the existence of the capitalist system as a whole.” Grossman was at pains to show that Kautsky’s was a subjective analysis and that the opposite was true: that massive overaccumulation brought about a systemic breakdown and world war followed necessarily because it was the only way to sufficiently devalue capital, to “ward off imminent collapse” and “create a breathing space” for accumulation to restart. Grossman cites the figure from Wladimir Woytinsky’s 1925 book The World In Numbers that “around 35% of the wealth of mankind was destroyed and squandered in the four years” of the First World War, which had been preceded by a worldwide Long Depression – like the one we’re experiencing now – a series of economic ‘panics’ in the US, and intensifying inter-imperialist rivalries over trade routes and colonial territories. By the end of the war, says Grossman, the mass of living labour “confronted a reduced capital, and this created new scope for accumulation”. And yet it wasn’t enough – the 1929 Wall Street Crash followed, “a continuation of the unresolved economic crisis preceding World War One”, as Mattick says.[519] The New Deal attempted to resolve the crisis in the US and fascism attempted to resolve it in Germany (the equivalent of a New Deal in Germany through the SPD’s reforms having already failed before 1929). Neither worked. It would take an even more destructive global war to end the depression. This after Kautsky had claimed in 1927 that capitalism stood, “from a purely economic point of view, stronger than ever”.[520] The First World War – “legalised slaughter” in the apt words of Harry Patch, the last surviving combat soldier of that war from any country – killed 37 million people. The Second World War killed between 70 million and 85 million, 3% of the 1940 world population of an estimated 2.3 billion. The equivalent today from a world population of 7.53 billion would be 226 million. But given that today’s total accumulation and overaccumulation are considerably greater than before World War Two, it follows that it would take a considerably greater level of destruction to – again, temporarily – resolve the crisis. Given that and the fact that every major war following economic breakdown is decided only by total war (the US Civil War, the Peninsular War and the Crimean War being other prime examples), it could be argued that the amount of destruction required is so high now that today’s deepening crisis may at some point necessitate nothing short of a nuclear exchange between the imperialist powers. The Second World War ended with the US dropping the A-bomb on Japan, after all. If World War Three was not sufficiently destructive, then a bigger crisis would follow necessitating World War Four, just as World War Two followed World War One. And of course a Fourth World War would be necessitated at some point anyway. This is all assuming that the crisis that preceded a World War Three wasn’t the final breakdown, the absolute historical limit of capital accumulation. If it were then no amount of destruction could save capitalism. As we said earlier, this is surely now the case – there can be no 1945 productivity boom that breathes another century of life into the system, for automation has already all but abolished the law of value. The current arms race is in fact already accelerating the development of automation and therefore the rate of profit’s historical fall towards zero. We therefore assert that – aside from the fact that a world war today would end life on Earth and destroy the climate for good – even a world war cannot save capitalism this time. Rather than trying to destroy itself in order to renew itself this time, capitalism is now preparing to either destroy or wind itself up for good. Trade wars will continue to intensify. Protectionism becomes an increasingly inevitable reflex as nations attempt to defend domestic and overseas assets; combined with stagnant productivity, this tends to manifest politically in a parochial, ‘anti-globalisation’ nationalism, ie right-wing populism or proto-fascism, as capitalists which rely more on the domestic market – determining their conservatism – finally gain the upper-hand over the more liberal exporting sectors, only to deepen the overall economic crisis by making trade increasingly expensive and centralising capital into yet fewer hands. As Michael Pettis wrote in the FT in 2009, the fact that “nearly everyone agrees that a world that retreats into direct and indirect forms of trade protection is a world that is worse off... should not allay our worries. In the 1930s, it was also well understood that the crisis would be exacerbated by plunging international trade. This did not stop a descent into the protectionism which put the ‘Great’ into the Great Depression.” In February 2019, a senior European Commission economist warned that a Third World War is an increasingly “high probability” due to the “disintegration of global capitalism”.[523] Professor Hanappi, Jean Monnet Chair for Political Economy of European Integration , noted that the emerging trade wars, massive growth of military spending and return of ‘populism’ bear unnerving similarities with trends that beset the world before the outbreak of the first two world wars. Marx wrote that as soon as capital feels itself threatened it will “seek refuge in other forms”, which appear to perfect its rule as capital “through curbs on free competition”; although the curbs on competition “appear to complete the mastery of capital, they are at the same time, by curbing free competition, the heralds of its dissolution, and of the dissolution of the mode of production based on it”.[524] This applies to both the monopolistic stage of capitalism and the inevitability of protectionism. As mentioned, in 2015-16, the G20 economies introduced a record number of trade-restrictive measures. Globalisation was in retreat before Brexit and Trump, because its ability to expand capital is increasingly exhausted. Just as protectionism and trade wars were precursors of the first two world wars, Brexit and Trump’s trade wars threaten to be precursors of a Third World War. Just as the first two world wars were fought between the biggest imperialist rivals, so would a third. That would mean a conflict between the US and its strongest competitor, the German-led EU. On 6 November 2018 France President Emmanuel Macron called for the creation of a “true European army” so that the EU could defend itself from “China, Russia and even the United States of America”, adding: “When I see President Trump announcing that he’s quitting a major disarmament treaty[525] which was formed after the 1980s Euro-missile crisis that hit Europe, who is the main victim? Europe and its security.” Germany already provides the most troops for the UN’s so-called peacekeeping missions. Building on the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense (PESCO) agreement – which allows co-operation on joint military projects for 25 EU member states, established through the Lisbon Treaty in December 2017 – the European Commission provisionally agreed the founding of a €13bn European Defence Fund (EDF) in February. This is to allow joint R&D projects for European companies. Though no formal agreement is to come into effect until November 2019, it is already known that the fund will exclude both post-Brexit Britain and the US. In response the US complained that the moves undermine the NATO alliance and threatened sanctions on EU firms if either project goes ahead. The EU told the the US not to concern itself with Europe's defence plans. In December 2019 Macron said NATO was already “brain dead”, because “you have no co-ordination of decision-making whatsoever between the US and its NATO allies”. In reality, Europe is still reliant upon the US in military matters, a point made clear by, for example, the dominance of US firms in international contracts or the US’s role in NATO. Accordingly, the EU is, to some degree, split upon the US’s INF withdrawal, with key US allies Britain and Poland offering their unwavering support for the move. While disagreement in Europe over the Treaty itself is small, this reflects broader splits within the EU imperialist bloc, more evident in regard to trade and inter-European political discussions. More significantly in military terms, the US’s dominance over Europe’s military capacity means that Europe requires both time and new alliances if it is to stand on its own feet. Europe is now waking up to this. In July, Macron announced that France would build “a large space command within the Air Force, which will eventually become the Air and Space Force... to better protect our satellites, including in an active way”. Analysts called the move a switch from a defensive to an offensive posture. Macron's proposal follows similar moves by the US, China and Russia in recent years. In 2018, Trump ordered the formation of a sixth branch of the US’s armed forces – a "space force”. Europe's imperialists may have once hoped that the end of Trump's Presidency could see a reconciliation with the US bourgeoisie on more advantageous terms, but such hopes seem to be nothing but a fantasy. On 13 November 2018, a bipartisan panel for the US Congress issued a report stating its approval of the Trump administration's pursuit of “great power competition”. In March 2019, Nicole Gibson, Deputy Director of the US State Department’s office for Europe, warned that European companies would “risk significant sanctions” if they resume laying pipe for the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Germany. Construction work was suspended in the December because of winter weather. The deal has infuriated the US because it undermines the potential for its energy giants to export surplus shale gas to Europe as liquified natural gas (LNG). Furthermore, US clients in central Europe are also set to lose out. Snaking under the Baltic Sea, NS2 replaces an older pipeline, stripping Ukraine of gas transit fees worth $2.5bn a year, 4% of its GDP. Ukraine president Petro Poroshenko[526] fears NS2 would allow Russia to switch off gas to Ukraine and Central Europe to blackmail its nearer neighbours without disrupting supplies to Western Europe, enabling the Kremlin to exert greater political influence. Russia supplies more than one-third of the natural gas Europe uses, a figure that is expected to reach nearly 50% in the next decade. German businesses say NS2 will slash their energy costs. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that “geostrategically, Europe cannot have an interest in cutting off all relations with Russia”. In 2017 she said that “the times in which we could completely depend on [the US and Britain] are, to a certain extent, over. We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.” With the relative decline of the US and Britain’s pending departure from the EU, Germany either sees an opportunity to become dominant or the need to find more reliable allies. It may see an alliance with Russia as an extension of European imperialism, and as a replacement for Britain, which itself has reportedly sought to spread misinformation in Europe in an attempt to weaken relations between Germany and Russia.[527] Turkey too, a long time client state of the US, appears to be forming a new alliance with Russia and Germany. In June 2019, the EU and Russia started talks on transitioning to using the rouble and euro in bilateral payments instead of the US dollar. China and Turkey are also investing heavily in the euro. The US is gradually being isolated and the grip on the world economy that the dollar as the world currency anchor gives the US is slipping. In the same week, it emerged that the US had been stepping up its ability to wage a cyberwar on Russia’s power grid, something it had deployed against Venezuela several times, depriving hospitals, factories and residential areas of electricity, earlier in the year. These cyber attacks are acts of war by the US’s own definition. A similar situation is developing with regards to Iran.[528] When Trump pulled the US out of the 2013 Iran nuclear deal, in which Iran agreed to roll back parts of its nuclear programme in exchange for relief from sanctions, Germany, France and even, to the chagrin of the US, Britain – all desperate for outlets for profitable investment – denounced the move and vowed to find ways to circumvent the US ban on trading with Iran, which applies to third parties. In July Russia expressed interest in the EU’s proposed Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) mechanism, backing Iran’s demand that it would have to include the oil trade. Significantly, this would see the EU violating US sanctions on two fronts. Trump claims he is trying to stop a nuclear arms race in the Middle East but he is really motivated by competition. In March 2019, Miguel Berger, the Director-General for Economic Affairs and Sustainable Development at Germany’s Federal Foreign Office, complained that, while everyone else was banned from trading with Iran, US trade with Iran in 2018 had in fact doubled. The US says it wants a new deal that curbs Iran’s ballistic missile programme and ends Iran’s supposed influence in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the latter in which it is accused of backing the anti-imperialist Houthi movement. But it also wants to control Iran’s oil. The US’s increasingly belligerent client-states Israel and Saudi Arabia see Iran as a threat to their regional dominance and welcomed Trump’s move. [529] In May 2019 Trump warned Iran of “severe consequences” as the US, joined by Britain, began to build up naval and air power in the Persian Gulf. Fears of military conflict grew after Trump blamed Iran for Houthi attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman. While Britain – which, in a blatant act of piracy at the request of the US, later seized an Iranian oil tanker bound for Syria – sided with the US, the EU demanded an independent inquiry. Japan, which had a tanker involved in the controversy, also questioned the veracity of the US’s account. The same week, Iran shot down a US drone. Trump claimed that he called off a retaliatory airstrike at the last minute, instead imposing further suffocating sanctions and launching a cyberattack on Iran’s defence infrastructure. Sanctions have resulted in inflation in Iran of 40% and the IMF predicted a 6% contraction in its economy. Iran said it would have to develop its uranium enrichment levels if Europe did not do more shield Iran from sanctions.[530] Iran could be the spark that ignites conflict between the US and Europe.[531] Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s US-UK-backed war on Yemen has resulted, after four years, in what the UN called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis; and rising tensions between India and Pakistan at the beginning of 2019 threaten to spill over into a full-scale war, with the US generally backing the former and China the latter. Pakistan has taken out billions of dollars in loans from China in recent years as part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious trade and infrastructure network connecting China to Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and other regions. China has pledged to provide economic assistance to Pakistan, which has been bailed out by high- interest IMF loans some 14 times since 1980. The task of communists As we have said, Leninists have long predicted that these deepening splits would emerge. They have been proven correct, and the defeatist pseudo-Marxist theories of ‘ultra-imperialism’ – that the imperialist powers in fact form an unshakeable alliance – have been proven wrong. Existing divisions in NATO have been widening since the election of Trump, who has been unsurprisingly delighted by Brexit and its destabilising effect on the EU. Denouncing the EU’s “treatment” of Britain in the negotiations, Trump said at the start of April 2019 that “the EU is likewise a brutal trading partner with the US, which will change”. On 9 April he said the US planned to impose tariffs of $11bn (£8.4bn) on EU goods, partly because “EU subsidies to Airbus have adversely impacted the US”.[532] He must have known what was coming: on 10 April the EU and China announced a very significant trade deal in which they vowed, in a thinly veiled rebuke to the US, “to fight against unilateralism and protectionism”. China and Germany are now engaged in concrete military co-operation, with China deploying armoured vehicles on German soil for joint drills on 11 July, something that has been unthinkable until now.[533] At the same time, the potential for realignment with the US is also contained within the German approach. For example, the nation is considering sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait, escalating tensions with China and easing them with the US. As Trump is so fond of saying, “all options are on the table”. France has vowed to retaliate tit-for-tat against US sanctions. In Tony Kennedy’s foreword to the abridged 1992 English reprint of Grossman’s book, he says: “For Grossman, re-presenting Marx’s theory was no mere academic exercise. Nor was he concerned merely with describing tendencies towards periodic economic crises, of a more or less restricted character, nor even with trends towards more systematic and global recessions. He aimed to show that the essence of Marx’s analysis of capitalist society was the identification of the inexorable tendency towards breakdown as the fundamental characteristic of the social system as a whole.... Grossman contended that the socialist movement’s commitment to the overthrow of capitalism required theoretical proof of the system’s tendency towards breakdown.” This is now the task facing communists today. The first appeal that the Communist International made in 1920 to the international working class was to “Remember the imperialist war!”, warning that the repetition of such destructive wars, when the workers of different countries are coerced by the ruling classes to “cut each other’s throats” is not only possible but inevitable if capitalism is not overthrown.[536] The First World War confirmed what was written in the statutes of the First International, that the emancipation of the working class is not a local, nor a national, but an international question. And given that national bourgeoisies are inevitably pitted against each other in a world war, it follows that the only class that is capable of solidarity internationally is the working class. Nation-states will either respond to the looming crash as it deepens by cutting military expenditure drastically or waging war in a bid to offset economic losses – or perhaps by doing both. We are being haunted by the failure to turn the breakdowns that precipitated the first two world wars into the world revolution that Lenin expected to follow on the heels of the one he led in Russia. Only world socialism can ensure humanity’s survival.

#### **Capitalist accumulation makes inequality and fascism a structural condition---rise of alt-right fascist nationalism makes warfare inevitable**

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In the broader picture, fascism, whether in its 20th- or 21st-century variant, is a particular, far right response to capitalist crisis, such as that of the 1930s and the one that began with the financial meltdown of 2008 and has now been greatly intensified by the pandemic. Trumpism in the United States; Brexit in the United Kingdom; the increasing influence of neo-fascist and authoritarian parties and movements throughout Europe (including Poland, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Belgium and Greece), and around the world (such as in Israel, Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil and India), represent just such a far-right response to the crisis. Trumpism and Fascism The telltale signs of the fascist threat in the United States are in plain sight. Fascist movements expanded rapidly since the turn of the century in civil society and in the political system through the right wing of the Republican Party. Trump proved to be a charismatic figure able to galvanize and embolden disparate neo-fascist forces, from white supremacists, white nationalists, militia, neo-Nazis and Klansmen, to the Oath Keepers, the Patriot Movement, Christian fundamentalists, and anti-immigrant vigilante groups. Since 2016, numerous other groups have emerged, from the Proud Boys and QAnon to the Boogaloo movement (whose explicit goal is to spark a civil war) and the terrorist Michigan group known as Wolverine Watchmen. They are heavily armed and mobilizing for confrontation in near-perfect consort with the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, which long since has captured that party and turned it into one of utter reaction. Encouraged by Trump’s imperial bravado, his populist and nationalist rhetoric, and his openly racist discourse, predicated in part on whipping up anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-Black sentiment, they began to cross-pollinate to a degree not seen in decades as they gained a toehold in the Trump White House and in state and local governments around the country. Paramilitarism spread within many of these organizations and overlapped with state repressive agencies. Racist, far right and fascist militia, identified by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security as the most lethal domestic terrorist threat, [operate inside law enforcement agencies](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law). As far back as 2006, a [government intelligence assessment](http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/402521/doc-26-white-supremacist-infiltration.pdf) had warned of “white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement by organized groups and by self-initiated infiltration by law enforcement personnel sympathetic to white supremacist causes.” The fascist insurgency reached a feverish pitch in the wake of the mass protests sparked by the police-perpetrated murder of George Floyd in May. Among recent incidents too numerous to list, fascist militia members have routinely showed up heavily armed at anti-racist rallies to threaten protesters, and in several instances, have carried out assassinations. Trump has refused to condemn the armed right-wing insurgency. To the contrary, he [defended a self-described vigilante and “Blue Lives Matter” enthusiast](https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/08/31/908137377/trump-defends-kenosha-shooting-suspect) who shot to death two unarmed protesters in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on August 25. On September 3, federal marshals carried out an extra-judicial execution of [Michael Reinoehl](https://truthout.org/articles/trump-appears-to-admit-extrajudicial-killing-of-michael-reinoehl-was-planned/), who admitted to shooting a few days earlier a member of the white supremacist group Patriot Prayer during a confrontation between Trump supporters and counterprotesters in Portland, Oregon. “There has to be [retribution](https://www.vox.com/2020/9/14/21436216/trump-michael-reinoehl-protests-portland-shooting),” declared Trump in a chilling interview in which he seemed to take credit for what amounted to a death squad execution. Particularly ominous was the plot by a domestic terrorist militia group, broken up on October 8, to storm the Michigan state capitol to kidnap and possibly kill the Democratic governor of Michigan and other officials, a conspiracy that the White House refused to condemn. While there are great differences between [20th- and 21st-century fascism](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/FascismbeyondTrump.pdf) and any parallels should not be exaggerated, we would do well to recall the 1923 [“beer hall putsch”](https://www.britannica.com/event/Beer-Hall-Putsch/The-Munich-Putsch) in Bavaria, Germany, which marked a turning point in the Nazis’ rise to power. In that incident, Hitler and a heavily armed group of his followers hatched a plot to kidnap leaders of the Bavarian government. Loyal government officials put down the putsch and jailed Hitler but the fascist insurgency expanded in its aftermath. The fascist putsch now hinges on the November election. The rule of law is breaking down. Trump has claimed, without any credible evidence, that the vote will be fraudulent, has refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power should he lose, and has all but called on his supporters to be prepared for an insurrection. Himself a [transnational capitalist](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/TheTransnationalCapitalistClass.pdf), a racist and a fascist, Trump took advantage of the protests over the murder of George Floyd to bring the project to a new level, inciting from the White House itself the fascist mobilization in U.S. civil society, manipulating fear and a racist backlash with his “law and order” discourse, and threatening a qualitative escalation of the police state. Widespread and systematic voter suppression, especially of those from marginalized communities, has already [disenfranchised](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/07/americans-voting-rights-disenfranchisement) millions. Donald Trump Jr. [called in September for](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election/donald-trump-jr-video-2020-election-ballot-fraud-b605186.html) “every able-bodied man and woman to join an army for Trump’s election security operation.” Morphology of the Fascist Project The current crisis of global capitalism is both structural and political. Politically, capitalist states face spiraling crises of legitimacy after decades of hardship and social decay wrought by neoliberalism, aggravated now by these states’ inability to manage the health emergency and the economic collapse. The level of global social polarization and [inequality is unprecedented](https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/ib-wealth-having-all-wanting-more-190115-en.pdf). The richest 1 percent of humanity control more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent had to make do with just 5 percent of this wealth. Such extreme inequalities can only be sustained by extreme levels of state and private violence that lend themselves to fascist political projects. Structurally, the global economy is mired in a crisis of overaccumulation, or chronic stagnation, made much worse by the pandemic. As inequalities escalate, the system churns out more and more wealth that the mass of working people cannot actually consume. As a result, the global market cannot absorb the output of the global economy. The transnational capitalist class cannot find outlets to “unload” the trillions of dollars it has accumulated. In recent years, it has turned to mind-boggling levels of financial speculation, to the raiding and sacking of public budgets, and to militarized accumulation or accumulation by repression. This refers to how accumulation of capital comes increasingly to rely on transnational systems of social control, repression and warfare, as [the global police state](https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341644/the-global-police-state/) expands to defend the global war economy from rebellions from below. Fascism seeks to rescue capitalism from this organic crisis; that is, to violently restore capital accumulation, establish new forms of state legitimacy and suppress threats from below unencumbered by democratic constraints. The project involves a fusion of repressive and reactionary state power with a fascist mobilization in civil society. Twenty-first-century fascism, like its 20th-century predecessor, is a violently toxic mix of reactionary nationalism and racism. Its discursive and ideological repertoire involves extreme nationalism and the promise of national regeneration, xenophobia, doctrines of race/culture supremacy alongside a violent racist mobilization, martial masculinity, militarization of civic and political life, and the normalization — even glorification — of war, social violence and domination. As with its 20th-century predecessor, the 21st-century fascist project hinges on the psychosocial mechanism of dispersing mass fear and anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis toward scapegoated communities, whether Jews in Nazi Germany, immigrants in the United States, or Muslims and lower castes in India, and also on to an external enemy, such as communism during the Cold War, or China and Russia currently. It seeks to organize a mass social base with the promise to restore stability and security to those destabilized by capitalist crises. Fascist organizers appeal to the same social base of those millions who have been devastated by neoliberal austerity, impoverishment, precarious employment and relegation to the ranks of surplus labor, all greatly aggravated by the pandemic. As popular discontent has spread, far right and neo-fascist mobilization play a critical role in the effort by dominant groups to channel this discontent away from a critique of global capitalism and toward support for the transnational capitalist class agenda dressed in populist rhetoric. The fascist appeal is directed in particular to historically privileged sectors of the global working class, such as white workers in the Global North and urban middle layers in the Global South, that are experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility and socioeconomic destabilization. The flip side of targeting certain disaffected sectors is the violent control and suppression of other sectors — which, in the United States, come disproportionately from the ranks of surplus labor, communities that face racial and ethnic oppression, or religious and other forms of persecution. The mechanisms of coercive exclusion include mass incarceration and the spread of prison-industrial complexes; anti-immigrant legislation and deportation regimes; the manipulation of space in new ways so that both gated communities and ghettos are controlled by armies of private security guards and technologically advanced surveillance systems; ubiquitous, often paramilitarized policing; “non-lethal” crowd control methods; and mobilization of the culture industries and state ideological apparatuses to dehumanize victims of global capitalism as dangerous, depraved and culturally degenerate. Racism and Competing Interpretations of the Crisis We cannot under-emphasize the role of racism for the fascist mobilization in the United States. But we need to deepen our analysis of it. The U.S. political system and the dominant groups face a crisis of hegemony and legitimacy. This has involved the breakdown of the white racist historic bloc that to one extent or another reigned supreme from the end of post-Civil War reconstruction to the late 20th century but has become destabilized through capitalist globalization. The far right and neo-fascists are attempting to reconstruct such a bloc, in which “national” identity becomes “white identity” as a stand-in (that is, a code) for a racist mobilization against perceived sources of anxiety and insecurity. Yet many white members of the working class have been experiencing social and economic destabilization, downward mobility, heightened insecurity, an uncertain future and accelerated precariatization — that is, ever more precarious work and life conditions. This sector has historically enjoyed the ethnic-racial privileges that come from white supremacy vis-à-vis other sectors of the working class, but it has been losing these privileges in the face of capitalist globalization. The escalation of veiled and also openly racist discourse from above is aimed at ushering the members of this white working-class sector into a racist and a neo-fascist understanding of their condition. Racism and the appeal to fascism offer workers from the dominant racial or ethnic group an imaginary solution to real contradictions; recognition of the existence of suffering and oppression, even though its solution is a false one. The parties and movements associated with such projects have put forth a racist discourse, less coded and less mediated than that of mainstream politicians, targeting the racially oppressed, ethnic or religious minorities, immigrants and refugees in particular as scapegoats. Yet in this age of globalized capitalism, there is little possibility in the United States or elsewhere of providing such benefits, so that the “wages of fascism” now appear to be entirely psychological. The ideology of 21st-century fascism rests on irrationality — a promise to deliver security and restore stability that is emotive, not rational. It is a project that does not and need not distinguish between the truth and the lie. The Trump regime’s public discourse of populism and nationalism, for example, bears no relation to its actual policies. Trumponomics involves a sweeping deregulation of capital, slashing social spending, dismantling what remains of the welfare state, privatization, tax breaks to corporations and the rich, anti-worker laws, and an expansion of state subsidies to capital — in short, radical neoliberalism. Trump’s populism has no policy substance. It is almost entirely symbolic — hence the significance of his fanatical “build the wall” and similar rhetoric, symbolically essential to sustain a social base for which the state can provide little or no material bribe. This also helps to explain the increasing desperation in Trump’s bravado as the election approaches. But here is the clincher: Deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and rising insecurity do not automatically lead to racist or fascist backlash. A racist/fascist interpretation of these conditions must be mediated by political agents and state agencies. Trumpism represents just such a mediation. To beat back the threat of fascism, popular resistance forces must put forward an alternative interpretation of the crisis, involving a social justice agenda founded on a working-class politics that can win over the would-be social base of fascism. This would-be base is made up of a majority of workers who are experiencing the same deleterious effects of global capitalism in crisis as the entire working class. We need a social justice and working-class agenda to respond to its increasingly immiserated condition, lest we leave it susceptible to a far right populist manipulation of this condition. Joe Biden may well win the election. Yet even if he does so and manages to take office, the crisis of global capitalism and the fascist project it is stoking will continue. A united front against fascism must be based on a social justice agenda that targets capitalism and its crisis.

#### Only socialism achieves the absolute decoupling required to stave off environmental collapse

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Socialism or extinction is not just a slogan, though; it is a statement of scientific fact. If XR does not stand for socialism, then it must necessarily stand for extinction, rendering its own alleged purpose redundant. In short: capitalism is a profit-dependent system, and must therefore continue to expand production in order to keep investment flowing and profits rising (in absolute terms). And since profit arises from capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour, the intensity of the production based on fossil fuel and toxic, fuel-intensive metal mining is (increasingly) necessary. To flesh this out a bit more: capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour is the [sole source of profit](http://gesd.free.fr/kliman99.pdf) — the capitalist appropriates surplus value (surplus labour time) from the worker, i.e the worker keeps less value than they create, covering their living costs (necessary labour time), and surplus value is then realised through commodity sales. This social relation is obscured by the money-wage relation. Therefore, capital’s evermore demanding need to accumulate is based on the continual expansion of intensive production, i.e. the extraction of fossil fuel and metals, deforestation, intensive farming, etc., that is releasing carbon and other ‘greenhouse’ emissions — not to mention that they are fuel-intensive practices in the first place and toxic to the local environment — trapped in nature into the atmosphere, making the planet warmer and threatening runaway global heating that, according to numerous scientific studies, will make the planet uninhabitable for humans, probably before the end of the present century. (Capital’s exploitation of labour is therefore also the root cause of [alleged plummeting sperm counts](https://grossmanite.medium.com/declining-sperm-counts-polluted-breast-milk-autoimmune-disorders-the-diabolical-legacy-of-53462aa1245d) (down a reported 59% from 1973 to 2011), further threatening extinction. The microplastics, nanoparticles and toxic chemicals sourced from fossil fuels and metal mines and consumed in everyday products penetrate and damage human cells.) Although extractive industries are usually now very capital-intensive — the source of capitalism’s ([now existential) economic crisis](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0) — the rate of exploitation of the remaining workers is very high. It is not capitalism’s need for ‘infinite growth on a planet of finite resources’, as most leftists seem to put it, that is the central or immediate problem; rather, it is the pace of production and its expansion — determined by the size of an ever-larger total capital and its need to expand yet further by feeding off labour — relative to nature’s ability to replenish itself (something capitalism’s dependence on intensive extraction obviously hinders). Just as surplus value is converted into capital faster than it is produced — resulting in (on average) decennial recessions and, eventually, a historical limit to capital accumulation — so nature is converted into capital faster than it can be replenished. Compound accumulation Fossil fuels (petroleum, coal, natural gas and orimulsion) would shrink to roughly half of total primary energy supply in 2050, from about 77% in 2020 — [down from 81% in 2010](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-total-primary-energy-demand-by-fuel-2010-2019) — if the world meets the ‘minimum’ internationally agreed target of 2 degrees Celsius warming, [according to S&P Global Platts Analytics](https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/062320-fossil-fuels-energy-mix-infographic-interactive). (Even 1C has already seen a reported [400,000 people (and counting) a year dying from climate-related causes](https://www.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/public_health/Death-toll-from-climate-change-estimated-at-400000-In-2010.html); while the Arctic permafrost — containing 1.8 trillion tonnes of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in Earth’s atmosphere — is, we are told,[2] melting [70 years sooner than previously expected](https://bigthink.com/surprising-science/canada-permafrost). While fossil fuel may fall to 50% of the mix of energy production, its absolute production may rise, since economic output under capitalism tends to double every 20 years.[3] As Jason Hickel writes in his book Less Is More, there was “a steady rise of material use in the first half of the 1900s, doubling from 7 billion tons per year to 14 billion tons per year. But then, in the decades after 1945, something truly bewildering happens… material use explodes: it reaches 35 billion tons by 1980, hits 50 billion tons by 2000, and then screams up to an eye-watering 92 billion tons by 2017… This increase in material use tracks more or less exactly with the rise of global GDP. The two have grown together in lockstep. Every additional unit of GDP means roughly an additional unit of material extraction. “There has been a radical acceleration of fossil fuel use since 1945, rising along with the explosion in both GDP and material use. And carbon emissions have gone up right along with it. Annual emissions more than doubled from 2 billion tons per year to 5 billion tons per year during the first half of the 1900s. During the second half of the century they rose fivefold, reaching 25 billion tons by the year 2000. And they have continued to rise since then, despite a string of international climate summits, reaching 37 billion tons in 2019. Of course, there is no intrinsic relationship between energy use and CO2 emissions. It all depends on what energy source we’re using. Coal is by far the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels. Oil — which has grown much more quickly than coal since 1945 — emits less CO2 per unit of energy. And natural gas is less intensive still. As the global economy has come to rely more on these less polluting fuels, one might think that emissions would begin to decline.… [But] because GDP growth is driving total energy demand up at such a rapid pace … these new fuels aren’t replacing the older ones, they are being added on top of them. The shift to oil and gas hasn’t been an energy transition, but an energy addition. “The same thing is happening right now with renewable energy… To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries at the grid level. This means 40 million tons of lithium — an eye-watering 2,700% increase over current levels of extraction… It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing real problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet, killing off whole freshwater ecosystems. The lithium boom has barely started, and it’s already a catastrophe… “Today the world is producing 8 billion more megawatt hours of clean energy each year than in 2000. That’s a lot — enough to power all of Russia. But over exactly the same period, economic growth has caused energy demand to increase by 48 billion megawatt hours. “There’s also something else going on. With every year that goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to extract the same amount of materials from the earth. Today, three times more material has to be extracted per unit of metal than a century ago.”[4] There is no such thing as ‘green capitalism’. The ‘Green New Deal’ proposed by social democrats — which actually involves privatising the last areas of common land — is species suicide. Socialism and non-intensive production Under capitalism, commodities are only produced if they are profitable, i.e. if labour is exploitable enough to expand capital. They are use-values/utilities and exchange-values. Under socialism, goods (having been decommodified) are produced if we deem them to be useful, via democratic regulation and demand. They are just use-values and socially owned, so no exchange of ownership takes place, i.e. exchange value and profit are abolished. If we deem that a good is not useful since it is damaging the environment or contributing to climate change too much, we can decide not to make it. Or we can find a way of making it that does not damage or exhaust nature. Rather than fossil fuel (which disappears into thin air and so has to be extracted anew by exploited labour, making it perfect for the needs of capital) or metals (which are finite), we could use non-labour-intensive renewables — sunlight, wind and especially (for physical products) fibrous plants ([especially hemp](https://medium.com/@Grossmanite/the-green-new-deal-is-species-suicide-only-a-hemp-based-industrial-revolution-can-save-earths-f9c3dc29c4e3), which can replace steel, concrete, graphene, lithium and fossil fuel) and [mycelium](https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-mycelium-revolution-is-upon-us/) (from which we can even make [computers](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsfs.2018.0029)). And because socialism can plan and co-ordinate production as a whole on a break-even basis, instead of having to bow to the demands of capital accumulation and anarchic competition between private producers, we can grow economic output at the rate nature replenishes (or slower) — something that socialism could help instead of hinder. Achieving the abundant material wealth for all promised by communism (as it develops into its higher stage, when production becomes fully automated and, eventually, free) is part of the solution. Fibrous plants like hemp [quickly draw down and sequester CO2](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hemp-and-lots-of-it-could_b_328275?guccounter=1) while reviving the soil, reversing desertification; and the products made from them (including bioplastic that is 10 times stronger than steel; batteries that [outperform lithium and graphene](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-28770876); and highly-insulating [carbon-negative hempcrete](https://www.ukhempcrete.com/services/better-than-zero-carbon-buildings/)) keep that carbon sequestered indefinitely. Abundant material wealth for all includes abundant vegetation, permaculture, afforestation, etc. There is also the potential for micro-organisms to supply a near-infinite source of energy. In 2018, scientists in the US confirmed a theory first proposed by Soviet geologists when they found [huge populations of bacteria living in the extreme temperatures of Earth’s crust](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/deep-life-microbes-underground-bacteria-earth-surface-carbon-observatory-science-study-a8677521.html), despite the lack of photosynthesis and nutrients, living solely from chemical reactions fuelled by geothermal energy. They estimated that up to 23 billion tonnes of micro-organisms live in this “deep biosphere”, making it the largest ecosystem on the planet and accounting for nearly 400 times the amount of carbon found in all living humans. Here lies a potential source of abundant energy (although we will have to assess whether the benefits outweigh the impacts of drilling). Other scientists have even found that the Geobacter bacteria found in human waste can convert sewage into fresh water and [produce electricity in the process](https://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/technologies/18may_wastenot.html). It is now thought that one day [microbial fuel cells](https://www.nasa.gov/feature/ames/could-electricity-producing-bacteria-help-power-future-space-missions/) could power our phones, household appliances — and even spaceships. Investment in microbial fuel cells will remain seriously limited, however, until value-creation is based solely on utility instead of exploitation and profit, since capital cannot exploit the labour time of microbes! Modern science — which is looking more and more ‘presocialist’, i.e. systematic, holistic and dialectial-materialist (the Marxist method of assessing history as moving forward through material and social interactions)— has proven that humans depend on plants and bacteria for everyday life, [smashing the myth of The Individual](https://aeon.co/essays/science-and-metaphysics-must-work-together-to-answer-lifes-deepest-questions) — the world is powered by collectivism. Indeed, trees, plants and bacteria are our relatives. The world is one interconnected whole. The socialisation of the means of production, whereby the means of production are owned by humanity instead of capital, will thus be a ‘naturalising’ humanisation, plantification and microbiolisation of production. Other forms of existing carbon-negative production that could be scaled up include ‘sky mining’ for diamonds that are chemically identical to earth diamonds, another industry that only exists on a small scale under capitalism because of the lack of labour exploitation involved. Emissions-free, energy-dense nuclear power, is also an option. The initial impact of mining uranium on the environment must be re-assessed by an independent socialist state, but to prove our earlier point, nuclear has not been abandoned because of safety fears, but because its capital-intensity has become unprofitable as ever-growing total capital becomes harder and harder to expand by the relatively diminishing pool of human labour. In terms of worker safety, nuclear is [the safest form of energy production](https://amp.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/nov/04/why-eco-austerity-wont-save-us-from-climate-change). There is also the prospect of space-based solar power and associated wireless transmission, without the intermittency of night time or winter suffered by solar panels and wind turbines on Earth. This, too, however, has proven too expensive for investors who won’t invest without the prospect of a higher return. Reverting to overly local, small-scale production—which would make everything more expensive — is not an option. Sea levels are rising and we probably need to build incredibly vast dikes on every continent. Rising temperatures will also massively increase the demand for air conditioning, which will have to be powered by something abundant and emissions-free, like nuclear. But socialism never works? Clearly, we need world socialism. Countries that are arguably ‘semi-socialist’ or that are supposedly ‘working towards’ socialism, like China and Venezuela, still work to some extent on the basis of commodity-production. But even ‘fully’ socialist countries still have to trade with capitalist countries, and that means having to make concessions to capital, working within a world capitalist system and having to maintain military defences at the expense of the civilian economy. Nor can they fully plan their economies due to fluctuating, unpredictable foreign prices. The need to build up foreign currency also incentivises black markets. Again, because socialist production is based on utility, socialism will also be able to invest in things like mineralising CO2 (turning it permanently into basalt rock). This is not a silver bullet since it is water-intensive, but it could certainly be scaled up significantly where water scarcity is not an issue (or if [water can be ‘artificially’ produced](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071031125457.htm)). That we are not doing this is a travesty — but where it would be a productive industry under socialism, it is an unproductive industry under capitalism, since it does not offer a commodity that can be sold for profit (unless it is sold to the state using public debt, thereby creating no new value and contributing to money devaluation that [will eventually (imminently) cause hyperinflation](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0)). It would therefore have to be funded by taxes that eat into already thinning profit margins, and so these taxes are resisted by capitalists, who anyway run the capitalist state. They are incapable of changing the system, even as it threatens to produce an ecocidal holocaust. Capitalism is now effectively an extinction cult and can only continue to steer Earth into the sun. Socialism — which is anyway [becoming an economic necessity](https://fleetworld.co.uk/road-test-hyundai-i30/) for the first time — gives humanity the chance of steering Earth to safety, in the nick of time.

### 1AC---Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws in service of socialism.

### 1AC---Solvency

#### The plan utilizes antitrust law to prohibit all private sector activity---full nationalization is the only way to enable socialist transition

Foster ’13 [John Bellamy Foster, “Marx, Kalecki, and Socialist Strategy,” April 1, 2013, Monthly Review]

The principal strategic aim of the new Labour government would need to be directed at “changing the power relations in society, by capturing the key centres of the economic, social, and political power of the strongest capitalist groups.” Kalecki argued for “full central public control of banking, and finance, investment and foreign trade, and possibly the allocation of basic raw materials and commodities.” This required “direct social control” of key industrial sectors, either through “full nationalization” or the establishment of “some kind of public corporation.” The most important requirements here were “that those who direct and manage the [public] corporation have no financial interest other than their salaries,” and that if there were any private investors they be allowed “no control over policy or management.”38

All of this, Kalecki recognized, would be strongly resisted by capital, which would use all of its means, including sabotage, to block any changes that threatened its class position. Nevertheless, he argued that if the Labour Party were to exert its full strength at the end of war it would be able to generate a full-employment economy, turning this into a means of further ratcheting up working-class power. “This period, which may be short, will be the one of maximum opportunity for Labour, when full employment has generated a self-confident feeling among workers. Then will be the time to use Labour’s political power to the full; to strike boldly and strike hard. This will be the moment to the lay the basis for that continuing social revolution without which democratic socialist planning will remain a sterile dream.”39

Kalecki’s political-economic strategy for social change was aimed at fatally undermining what Marx had called capital’s main “lever” for the disciplining the working class: the existence of a relative surplus population or industrial reserve army. By removing this lever from capital, it would be possible to alter the rules of the game.40 The maximum response of capital in this class struggle, meanwhile, would be to attempt to generate what Steindl later called “stagnation as policy,” opposing all state policies to check unemployment and even stagnation, and increasing the reserve army of labor in order to preserve the social power of the capitalist class—even at the expense of total profits.41

As it turned out in Britain in the 1940s and thereafter, Labour came to power but did not—even during its maximum influence—exert its full power in a project of class transition in line with the course that Kalecki had proposed.42 With the rise of Thatcherism in Britain and Reaganism in the United States in the 1970s and ‘80s, capital itself, as Steindl observed, sought to break with the political business cycle, putting in its place the regressive “political trend,” now known as neoliberalism. This was an attempt to turn back the clock to a pre-Keynesian-style economic regime aimed at increasing unemployment, in order to squeeze wages and impose greater class discipline on workers. At the same time a financially driven casino economy was opened up for the benefit of capital.43 Full employment and wage inflation were depicted once again as threats to prosperity, in what Steindl referred to as “the return of the Bourbons” in economic theory.44

The economic effects of this restoration of pre-Keynesian economics are evident in the trends in the United State over the last four decades or so. The percentage of production and nonsupervisory workers in total private-sector employment has remained constant at about 83 percent of all workers in both 1965 and 2011. Nevertheless the share of such workers in total private-sector payroll dropped from 76 percent in 1965 to 56 percent in 2011, while their share of GDP fell over the same period from over 30 percent to about 20 percent.45 Under these conditions even a mainstream economist such as Paul Krugman was compelled to declare in 2012, that we are “back to talking about capital versus labor…[an] almost Marxist sort of discussion.”46 Moreover, in trying to discern why full-employment policy is off limits at the top of U.S. society even in the context of deep stagnation and growing inequality, Krugman in his 2012 book End This Depression Now! could find no other rational explanation than the one offered by Kalecki—namely that capital saw full employment as a threat to its total social power.47

In Kalecki’s view, the capitalist class’ entrenched opposition to long-run full employment through government intervention meant that workers had no recourse but to push forward on their own in the struggle for higher wages and full employment and to seek on that basis a full transition to socialism. “Labour,” he warned in 1942,must have no illusions about the great fight that will have to be waged against these [capitalist interest] groups. They will resist fiercely because what is at stake is not so much their profits as their personal and social power, which takes two forms: power in society as a whole, and power over workers’ industry. As long as the first form of power remains, all the efforts of the workers in the factories and through the trade unions to diminish the second form of power can only have limited success. The fight for workers’ rights in industry and for more effective workers’ representation through such things as works’ councils and production committees is, of course, of very great importance and…it has a vital part to play in the total struggle against the capitalists. But it can never be a substitute for the necessary political fight to destroy the power wielded over society as a whole by the great capitalist interest-groups….

Their power is in fact a class power and, as long as this class power remains unbroken, the ability of the leading capitalist groups to run things in their way—and, at worst, to sabotage—is enormous….It can only be broken by destroying not merely their political influence, but what is its real basis, their economic power in the great productive forces over which they exercise practically unchallenged control….

The important thing, however, is that Labour should not be afraid of the consequences of the social revolution within industry, but should make itself master of the situation, not by trying to damp down the mood of the workers, as did the leaders of the Popular Front in France, but by directing it against the opponents of democratic planning.48

Kalecki’s political-economic analysis here was based, as he explained, on an “isolated” capitalist economy.49 As historical events unfolded, not only did the Labour Party fail to act decisively in the working-class interest, but also the increased militarism and imperialism during the Cold War, as he was later to observe, altered the picture considerably. Increased armaments spending produced a higher level of employment than in the pre-war years, while at the same time incorporating a considerable part of the working class within a regressive nationalist-imperialist and chauvinistic project—thereby undermining labor’s capacity to unite to promote its genuine interests in the class struggle.50 In the highly globalized monopoly-finance capitalism of today the contradictions facing the working-class movement are even more complex. Capital in the form of multinational corporations is increasingly mobile globally and able to divide and conquer labor internationally, holding down wages and unit labor costs worldwide as workers of different nationalities are pitted against each other.51

Nevertheless, Kalecki’s arguments on not accepting the economic rationale of the system and insisting on the need to wrest social power from the capitalist class remain crucial today. The danger of the profit-squeeze theory of economic crisis under capitalism has always been that it suggested to workers that the pursuit of their own democratic, egalitarian aspirations led directly to economic slowdown, worsening their situation. As Kalecki put it, “There are certain ‘workers’ friends’ who try to persuade the working class to abandon the fight for wages in its own interest, of course. The usual argument used for this purpose is that the increase of wages causes unemployment, and thus is detrimental to the working class as a whole.”52 This position is visible in the United States today with the debate over whether to introduce a paltry increase in the minimum-wage.53

The arguments that Marx and Kalecki leveled against the profit-squeeze theory of crisis have proven correct not only in their day but ours as well. Decade after decade we have seen a declining share of wages (and total compensation) in U.S. GDP—with the share of the bottom 80 percent of private-sector workers plummeting. At the same time the share of GDP represented by management, supervisory, and other nonproduction employees in the private sector has been rising dramatically.54 Meanwhile, capital’s overall share of income has grown by leaps and bounds. Rather than a stable framework of accumulation, this has led to stagnation, financial instability, and deteriorating conditions for workers.

Kalecki’s political-economic conclusions were in line with those of Marx, who declared, in his opposition to the profit-squeeze argument, that the struggle of workers at every point along the way was a rational one, reflecting the superiority of the political economy of the working class over the political economy of capital. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of the working-class struggle was not to strive for this or that gain within the system, but rather to replace the capitalist system with a socialist one controlled by the direct producers. As Marx stated in the closing sentence of Value, Price and Profit: “Instead of the conservative motto: ‘A fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work!’ they [the working class] ought to inscribe on their banner the revolutionary watchword: ‘Abolition of the wages system!’”55

#### Limited antitrust scope entrenches the control of capital---the plan radically departs from historical antitrust policies in favor of the abolition of capitalism

Fuchs '12 [Christian; 7/1/12; professor and chair in media and communication studies at Uppsala University's Department of Informatics and Media; "With or Without Marx? With or Without Capitalism? A Rejoinder to Adam Arvidsson and Eleanor Colleoni," https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v10i2.434/]

Do Arvidsson and Colleoni suggest alternatives? Do they have a vision of a life beyond capitalism? Open access, data portability, antitrust policies against capital concentration, building alternative platforms are mentioned in their article. They imagine “more ’democratic’“ social media (Arvidsson and Colleoni 2012, 147), do not question capitalism as such, but rather suggest a stronger regulation of the corporate Internet shall according to this conception exist in parallel with some alternative Internet platforms. The answer to the question asked in the title of this contribution is that to choose to be without Marx means to be in favour of capitalism and to support ideology, as Adam Arvidsson and Eleanor Colleoni’s approach shows very clearly. They advance an approach that is not only directed against Marx, but as a consequence also supportive of capitalism.

Arvidsson (2010) argues for building a peer-review system that is used for the evaluation of products by consumers and producers as an important element of an “ethical economy”. Social media, mobile phones and RFID could help to bring about a global and universal quantitative rating system for the economy (Arvidsson 2009). Arvidsson (2008) says that in such a system, the power of consumers and workers would increase, that companies as a result would mainly make money in the financial markets, and that capitalism would “become ethical in new and radical ways“ (Arvidsson 2008, 336). This would mean a “reform of capitalism“, the emergence of blended values and of a “global New Deal organised around sustainability and social responsibility“ (Arvidsson 2009, 27).

Arvidsson and Colleoni (2012, 147) say that their approach is “very un-Marxist in its conclusions”. Its political implications show indeed that the motivation for the authors’ criticism of Marxist theory is that they want to improve and not abolish capitalism. They imagine a more just, sustainable, and responsible capitalism. This terminology not only fits perfectly into contemporary neoliberal ideology, but is also naïve and idealistic: It ignores that all forms of capitalism are based on inequality and are crisis-prone. And crisis always means misery, precariousness, and more inequality. Capitalism is never responsible, sustainable, or ethical. The suggestion to entrepreneurs that they should support the ethical economy concept because such a transformed economy would enable them to make profits in the financial markets is furthermore arguing for an advancement of financialization and thereby ignores the high crisis-proneness of financial capitalism that has been proofed once more recently in the new world economic crisis. Arvidsson imagines that capitalism and a non-capitalistic economy can friendly co-exist in the form of an ethical capitalism. He thereby ignores the imperialistic and colonialist character of capitalism: imperialism creates milieus of accumulation, i.e. it commodifies spheres of non-capitalist existence in processes that David Harvey (2003) has termed accumulation by dispossession in order to guarantee its further existence. Capitalism is an inherently violent and expansive system that, as history has shown, does not accept any friendly co-existence with non-capitalist systems, but aims at their destruction. The contemporary crisis of capitalism and the existence of global inequality and precariousness have shown that we need alternatives to capitalism in order to create a humane society. My conclusion and approach is therefore in contrast to Arvidsson Marxist in character: it aims at the struggle for a humane, non-capitalist world. In terms of the Internet this means the ethical need of struggles for a non-capitalist Internet and the advancement of non-capitalist Internet platforms that contradict and struggle against the capitalist Internet and aim at the establishment of a communist Internet.

#### DPS is the optimal implementation of socialism---avoids the challenges that accompanied the Soviet model

Kotz 8 - economics professor at Amherst (David, https://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/What\_Ec\_Struc\_Soc\_08\_03.pdf, emuse)

The economic problems of actually existing socialism were not inherent in socialism, or in economic planning. They were structural problems of the particular form of planning that first arose in the Soviet Union and later appeared in other Communist Party ruled states. All of the economic problems listed in section 2 above were due to a key feature of that form of socialism: an absence of popular participation in decision-making in the economy and the state. There were various problematic policies, but the foregoing structural feature was the underlying source of the economic problems.5 Economic activity in any system will serve the needs of those who have power within that system. In a market economy ordinary consumers have a limited power -- they can decide not to purchase something. Hence, producers have be concerned with what ordinary consumers want to buy, since that is something they cannot fully control, try though they may. In Soviet-type planning, those actors with power were able to get high quality goods produced for them. No one ever claimed that Soviet weapons were of low quality, yet they were produced via the system of central planning. Soviet military leaders, and the ministers in charge of production of military equipment, were powerful and could demand high quality products. Similarly, some of the industrial ministers in civilian sectors had the power to demand high quality products, and some Soviet industrial products were world class.6 Special enterprises produced housing for high officials, and the quality of such housing was excellent.7 Powerful Soviet officials exercised their power by their ability to discipline or demote top enterprise officials if product quality was deemed unsatisfactory. It was an effective incentive. By contrast, ordinary households had almost no power in the Soviet planning system. Enterprise managers were not rewarded and punished based on how well they satisfied household consumers. The environmental damage from Soviet-type central planning resulted from an unaccountable leadership's focus on economic growth. The absence of democratic rights for the population prevented the emergence of a strong environmental movement that could have insisted on changed priorities. For economic planning to work effectively, power must be dispersed among all of the relevant groups in the economy, not monopolized by unaccountable high officials. Models of participatory planning have been elaborated by a number of authors (Devine, 1988, 2002; Albert and Hahnel, 1991). They involve democratic participation both in the economy and the state, which must be closely intertwined in a socialist system. These models share the following five principles: 1) wide participation in decision-making by those affected by a decision; 2) representation of the population as workers, community members, and consumers on decision-making bodies; 3) a decision-making process based on negotiation and compromise, to handle the inevitable existence of opposing interests among different groups; and 4) an equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of economic and political life. If consumer representatives sat on enterprise boards and on regional and national level planning bodies, they could insist that enterprises produce high quality consumer goods that people would like to purchase, with the power to set rewards and penalties to back up their demands. If the top political leaders are dependent on popular support for staying in office, they would be under pressure to make the system work to meet the needs of ordinary people. Democratic institutions, which in a capitalist system are always limited by the enormous political power of the rich, would work far better in a socialist system that has no class of wealthy property owners. The promise of getting rich is not necessary to build an efficient, innovative economy. "Innovation Institutes" could fund the testing out of new ideas, new products, and new services. Someone with a proposal for a new restaurant or service establishment could apply for funds and leasing rights to carry out their proposal, without departing from the principle of public ownership of productive property. Modest material rewards should be sufficient to encourage innovation and new and varied services, given the presence in any population of many individuals who are personally inclined to launch new projects. By providing representation for all constituencies in the making of allocation decisions, participatory planning would provide channels for all groups to see that their needs are addressed. It also recognizes the existence of conflicting interests even in a socialist society and provides institutions in which groups can negotiate and reach compromises. For example, enterprise boards having representatives of workers, consumers, and the community could strike a reasonable balance among workers' interest in not being overworked, consumers' interest in affordable and well-made products, and the community's interest in avoiding pollution of air and water. In a country having a relatively low living standard, a system of participatory planning would allow the population to demand a high rate of economic growth though democratic decisions about the resources to be devoted to investment and improved technologies. For participatory planning to work effectively, economic decisions should be as decentralized as possible to facilitate maximum participation by affected parties. Old-style central planning was overly centralized. Some economic decisions must be made at the center, but many can be made at a regional or local level. The claim that a system based on free markets is superior to any other in efficiency, innovation, and growth has no foundation. While a capitalist market economy can develop the forces of production and bring a rising level of material consumption for part of the population, history shows that it has been unable to build a society that meets the needs of the entire population. Only socialism can assure everyone material comfort, security, and a guaranteed opportunity to participate in productive labor, without some exploiting others. Only socialism can build a society based upon the better aspects of human nature, rather than its baser aspects, and finally enable people to become the real masters of their fate. But socialism can carry out this historic mission only if it embraces democracy and popular participation as the basis of its institutions.

#### American DPS goes global

PSL 8 (Party for Socialism and Liberation, [https://liberationschool.org/the-goal-of-socialism-peace-and-equality-amid-plenty/#](https://liberationschool.org/the-goal-of-socialism-peace-and-equality-amid-plenty/), emuse)

Experiences in socialist construction Thanks in great part to the practical experience of Lenin in making revolution, 21st-century socialists have a wealth of experience on which to base further conclusions. Marxists have been able to use accumulated theory and practice in order to lead revolutions in Russia, China, Korea, Yugoslavia, Cuba and many other countries. While there have been vast differences in the experiences of those socialist revolutions, they share one common feature: The socialist revolutions of the 20th century took place in countries where the level of productive forces was very low compared to the imperialist countries. Every successful revolution faced the primary task of developing their economies—while under constant military threat by world imperialism. For that reason, Lenin described the challenges of building communism in 1920 in very practical terms: “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.” There was no hope in building socialism if the economy remained underdeveloped. Because of the combined challenges of developing the productive forces under the gun of world imperialism, no socialist revolution has yet reached a stage where the “withering away of the state” could be imagined. Imperialism has seized on any weakness in the revolutionary states in order to foment counterrevolution. Nevertheless, the working classes in the countries that have set out to build socialism have made tremendous gains. Russia’s working class in 1917 was 4 percent of the population. Within 50 years, it was the second-most powerful economy in the world. China had never been able to feed its entire population prior to the revolution. Millions died during famines in China prior to 1949. Yet after the 1949 revolution, for the first time the economy was able to feed the largest population in the world. Despite immense pressure from imperialism, Cuba has been able to achieve tremendous gains—despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Cuban workers enjoy among the highest living standards of any of their counterparts in Latin America or much of the oppressed world. The continued military and economic dominance by world imperialism—first and foremost by U.S. imperialism—has made the transition to socialism that Marx and Lenin described so far impossible. The workers’ states have needed to devote a considerable part of their social development toward the strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship—the army and police—in order to defend against invasion or counterrevolution. Taking that next step will require a society based on the dictatorship of the proletariat in the United States. Toppling the world’s dominant capitalist power would not only lift a tremendous burden from the workers around the world who are trying to engage in socialist construction. It would put at the disposal of the world working class the tremendous wealth produced by the U.S. working class. All the social wealth extracted from the oppressed world by U.S. corporations and mines could be used to reverse the effects of centuries of colonial and imperialist exploitation. A revolution in the United States would undercut the economic basis for divisions among the working class that promote racism, sexism and homophobia. Socialism is a system of peace, justice and equality. The road to socialism begins with revolution in the United States.

#### Proletarianization makes class struggle inevitable - the aff accelerates and properly directs movements

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.amazon.com/Socialism-Extinction-Automation-Capitalist-Breakdown-ebook/dp/B081FHF2ZQ>, emuse)

Those who are lucky enough to find or remain in work as the capitalist crisis deepens will see their pay and conditions savagely forced down. In April 2018, the World Bank recommended yet more deregulation in a report that said “high minimum wages, undue restrictions on hiring and firing and strict contract forms all make workers more expensive vis-à-vis technology”.[437] International capital is preparing a major assault on international labour in order to accelerate moves towards automation. Even if the next crash is not a final breakdown, significant sections of the middle classes would be proletarianised and impoverished and the reserve army of labour would swell. Class struggle would explode. Capitalists could be forced to slow down or stop the introduction of new automation by, say, a strong and militant neo-Luddite or trade union movement and – the usual driver for concessions – the desire for social peace. But the contradiction persists: capital accumulation, and staying ahead of or keeping up with competitors, requires higher productivity and therefore labour-saving innovation. The deeper capitalism sinks into crisis the more necessary it becomes to raise productivity. That is, the more workers are replaced by robots, the greater the underproduction of surplus value becomes, and yet the system will need to respond by replacing more workers with robots. If it cannot do this then capital goes unvalorised and the economy crashes. From the perspective of the bourgeoisie, a strong neo-Luddite or trade union movement would sooner or later have to be crushed. In an article in January 2018 headlined “When the next recession hits, the robots will be ready”, the Washington Post pointed out that innovations happen quickest “when employers slash payrolls going into a downturn and, out of necessity, turn to software or machinery to take over the tasks once performed by their laid-off workers”.[438] Pointing to growing expectations by economists of a financial crisis in 2020, the paper adds that the “next wave of automation won’t just be sleek robotic arms on factory floors. It will be ordering kiosks, self- service apps and software smart enough to perfect schedules and cut down on the workers needed to cover a shift. Employers are already testing these systems. A recession will force them into the mainstream.” Striking statistics from an upcoming paper by economists Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu “found that 88% of job loss in routine occupations occurs within 12 months of a recession. In the 1990- 1991, 2001 and 2008-2009 recessions, routine jobs accounted for ‘essentially all’ of the jobs lost. They regained almost no ground during the subsequent recoveries.”[439] Automation under capitalism is therefore accelerating the trend towards proletarianisation, higher levels of poverty and the underproduction of surplus value. It is the sharpest of sharpening contradictions, a vicious circle from which capitalism cannot escape. It is a trend which increasingly threatens a final breakdown. The ‘Leninist’ road to socialism[440] – whereby working class organisations (soviets (workers’ councils), communes etc) effectively form an independent state and then, when strong enough, destroy what is left of the capitalist state – of course seems to be dismissed now more than ever – by liberals who claim that the demise of the Soviet Union signalled the end of history;[441] by the anarchists and autonomists who believe a leap into ‘full communism’ can be achieved without the socialist stage; and by ‘democratic socialists’ who claim socialism can be built via bourgeois democracy by voting through ‘socialist policies’. Then there is the notion that Marx and Lenin are redundant because the supposed protagonist of their revolutionary strategy – the industrial proletariat – is dead or irrelevant. There are several problems surrounding this. The accusation about the industrial proletariat is made, in slightly different ways, not just by liberals but by some anarchists, who do not claim that the industrial proletariat is dead but persist with the myth that it is the protagonist of the Leninist revolution. The Bolsheviks focused on agitating among the urban or industrial proletariat because that was the most efficient use of scarce resources, with the intention that the message would then spread outwards to the wider proletariat as a whole. This accusation that Leninists ignore the wider proletariat is often a projection of valid criticisms of some ‘Trotskyists’, who, while posing as Leninists, or at least distorting Leninism, do overemphasise the importance of the industrial worker. This is because Trotskyists – who for the same reason tend to be de facto pro-imperialist (by giving critical support to the Labour Party, for example) – tend to derive from labour aristocratic positions in trade unions and universities. Lenin though is renowned for criticising socialists who limited their agitation to “trade union consciousness” or “economism” – ie, simply supporting, or tailing, working class demands, without advocating an independent (non-social democratic) working class party or proletarian dictatorship (or, before that, the overthrow of tsarism) – and for his ruthless criticism of a labour aristocratic minority which misled the masses with solely reformist demands. Hence why he said revolutionaries had to “dig deeper into the real masses” of the poorest workers, who had the least to lose and the most to gain. This meant that, in Russia, he saw the need for an alliance between workers and poor peasants, an alliance that Leon Trotsky initially rejected. Today, real Leninists still see the poorest and most oppressed workers as the main protagonists of revolution. The claim that the industrial proletariat is dead is either dishonest or smacks of ‘first world’ myopia. The industrial proletariat may have shrunk in the imperialist nations over the past 40 years but internationally it has grown spectacularly. In 2010, 79%, or 541 million, of the world’s industrial workers lived in ‘less developed regions’, up from 34% in 1950 and 53% in 1980, compared to the 145 million industrial workers, or 21% of the total, who in 2010 lived in the imperialist countries.[442] This shift is even greater in the manufacturing industry, since in emerging nations manufacturing forms a much higher proportion of total industrial employment than in imperialist countries, and therefore, as John Bellamy Foster et al point out, “the broad category of ‘industrial employment’ systematically understates the extent to which the world share of manufacturing has grown in developing countries”, citing figures for the US and China showing these ratios to be 58.1% and 75.2% respectively.[443] “Extrapolating these two ratios to ‘more developed’ and ‘less developed’ countries as a whole, 83% of the world’s manufacturing workforce lives and works in the nations of the Global South,” says John Smith in Imperialism in the Twenty First Century.[444] Based on the integration of ‘Southern’ workers into the global economy, the IMF has also attempted to take into account qualitative as well as quantitative changes, calculating an “export-weighted global workforce” by multiplying the numerical growth of the workforce by the increasing degree to which they produce for the global market rather than the domestic market. Since Southern-manufactured exports grew more than twice as fast as GDP during the quarter-century leading up to the global crisis in 2007, the IMF estimates that the effective global workforce quadrupled in size between 1980 and 2003. But even within the imperialist nations, where the industrial working class has declined both absolutely and relatively, Smith points to “deepening proletarianisation”, saying that “the proletarians have increased their already overwhelming predominance within the economically active population [EAP].... Between 1980 and 2005 the proportion of waged and salaried workers in total EAP in ... the developed nations steadily rose, from 83% to 88% (in 2005, around 500 million people), indicating deepening proletarianisation in these countries.”[445] In the US, it is even higher, with waged workers as a proportion of the EAP increasing from 90.6% in 1980 to 93.2% in 2011.[446] Because of distortions made by the ILO’s methods, this undoubtedly underestimates or obscures the size of the labour aristocracy, something we will come back to further on, but the trend is nevertheless clear, with more and more workers being forced into low-paid services work. Obviously with China, India and the former Soviet bloc being integrated into the global economy, 1.47 billion workers joined the global capitalist workforce very suddenly. But this does not distort the overall trend. With their supposed bias for the industrial proletariat, Leninists are accused of failing to recognise the multiple sections of the working class or its fragmentation. But far from ignoring the heterogeneous make-up of the working class, this is one of the factors that contribute to the Leninist conclusion that a vanguard party is necessary – to unite the disparate and sectional struggles of the working class into one unstoppable force. Likewise, the fact recognised across the left that technological advances have fragmented the working class, that they have increased unemployment and underemployment and therefore reduced workers’ leverage in their struggles against their bosses, reflected in the imperialist countries by the low number of strikes since the 1980s, must mean that the state is the primary battleground. We are already seeing this in the re-emergence of social democratic movements (see the previous chapter), whereby downwardly mobile labour aristocracies are becoming slightly more antagonistic towards the ruling class, and are attempting to harness the power of the working class as a whole, in what is essentially a fight with the middle and ruling classes over allocations of surplus value. These strawman accusations against Lenin misrepresent or misinterpret his definition of the proletariat, which followed Marx’s. The main feature of the proletariat as a class is not its direct link with the means of production but rather its separation from them. In other words, the proletariat is first and foremost characterised as a class by the fact that it does not own the means of production and has to work for wages. The salient feature is not what differentiates them, but what unites them. The more a worker is dependant on selling their labour power for survival the deeper their proletarianisation. Indeed, it is the fact that the industrial proletariat is shrinking relative to the working class as a whole, relegating a significant proportion of previously privileged workers into the poorer sections of the working class, that sees the mass of the latter grow numerically in strength. As the mass of exploited manual workers decreases due to scientific and technological progress, particularly automation, the mass of exploited intellectual workers, ie white collar employees, engineers and scientists (who increasingly contribute to commodity production) also increases in reverse proportion. The casualisation of university employment in the past few years is a case in point. In the US, although union membership stood at a lowly 10.7% of the workforce at the start of 2019, the unionisation of traditionally non- unionised white collar labour almost doubled between 2010 and 2017.[447] According to the Pew Research Center, the median wealth (assets minus debts) of the US middle class fell by 28% from 2001 to 2013.[448] People on middle incomes[449] accounted for 50% of the US adult population in 2015, down from 61% in 1971, while the poorest tier of the working class comprised 20% of the population in 2015 compared to 16% in 1975. The number of people receiving supplemental nutritional assistance, or food stamps, exploded from 26 million in 2007 to 46 million in 2012.[450] And 63% of the population say they have less than $500 in personal savings.[451] At the same time private and household debt has gone through the roof. In the 1970s, personal and credit card debts shot up by 238% relative to the 1960s. In the 1980s it shot up on the previous decade by another 318% and by another 180% in the 1990s.[452] According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, household debt rose to a record $13.5 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2018, nearly 7% higher than in the third quarter of 2008. Even more troublingly, a record number of US Americans were three months or more behind on repayments for car loans (more than 7 million). As New York Times journalist Amy Chozick noted in May 2015, “the once ubiquitous term ‘middle class’ has gone conspicuously missing from the 2016 [presidential] campaign trail, as candidates and their strategists grasp for new terms for an unsettled economic era [in which] the middle class has for millions of families become a precarious place to be”.[453] Capitalism in the age of automation increasingly turns the majority of the population into proletarians and, in doing so, creates all economic, social and political prerequisites for the system’s downfall. The deeper the system sinks into crisis, the more proletarians are created, through unemployment, wage cuts and so on, and the more radical they are likely to become. This is borne out by the real development of the international proletariat. While we have already seen that the industrial proletariat has grown enormously, according to the ILO, the world’s “economically active population” (EAP) grew from 1.9 billion in 1980 to 3.1 billion in 2006.[454] Almost all of this numerical growth took place in the ‘emerging nations’, now home to 84% of the global workforce, 1.6 billion of whom worked for wages. The other one billion were small farmers and a multitude of people working in the ‘informal economy’,[455] which is, according to Mike Davis “the fastest growing social class on earth”.[456] While the industrial proletariat in the ‘Global South’ has grown enormously since 1980, its share of the South’s total workforce has been much more modest, rising from 14.5% in 1980, to 16.1% in 1990, to 19.1% in 2000, to 23.1% in 2010[457] – because the absolute growth of the non-industrial proletariat is even greater. Meanwhile, agricultural employment in the Global South has declined to 48% of its EAP, down from 73% in 1960, and from “approximately one-third” to just 4% of EAP in developed countries. However, the ILO reports: “Despite the declining share of agricultural workers in total employment, the absolute numbers of those engaged in agriculture are still rising, most notably in south Asia, east Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.”[458] The other significant component of the growing proletariat? The unemployed. Smith reports that, apart from China, “no economy has grown fast enough to provide jobs to the legions of young people entering the labour market and the rural exodus to swollen cities in search of work. Even at the zenith of export-oriented industrialisation the ILO reported that ‘in the late 20th century, manufacturing ceased being a major sector of employment growth, except in east and southeast Asia’.” Senior ILO economist Nomaan Majid said the commerce sector, not manufacturing, “is the main employment growth sector in both low- and middle-income groups”.[459] This links back to what we saw in chapter four – that even in the developing nations, the trend towards automation is accompanied by growing unproductive work and unemployment. The numerical growth of the working class has been coupled with a massive attack on its wages, further deepening proletarianisation. In a striking example of how constant capital rises relative to variable capital, John Lanchester writes in the London Review of Books that in the US: “In 1960, the most profitable company in the world’s biggest economy was General Motors (GM). In today’s money, GM made $7.6bn that year. It also employed 600,000 people. Today’s most profitable company employs 92,600. So where 600,000 workers would once generate $7.6bn in profit, now 92,600 generate $89.9bn, an improvement in profitability per worker of 76.65 times. Remember, this is pure profit for the company’s owners, after all workers have been paid. Capital isn’t just winning against labour: there’s no contest. If it were a boxing match, the referee would stop the fight.”[460] Whereas wages in the US rose by 350% between 1927 and 1977, real terms growth has since been in decline. In Britain, wages grew at an annual average of 2.9% in the 1960s and 70s, 1.5% in the 90s and 1.2% in the 2000s. Between 2007 and 2015 that trend accelerated at an unprecedented rate, with real household wages falling by 10.4%.[461] The Resolution Foundation said the 2010s would be the worst decade for UK wage growth since the late 18th century. But as bad as the attack on wages in imperialist countries has been, it has been even worse in the countries imperialism plunders, where workers are of course already paid much less. According to the ILO’s World of Work Report 2011, since the early 1990s the “share of domestic income that goes to labour ... declined in nearly three-quarters of the 69 countries with available information”. While “the wage share among advanced economies has been trending downward since 1975”, it “occurred at a much more moderate pace than among emerging and developing economies – falling roughly nine percentage points since 1980”.[462] In contrast, the fall in Asia between 1994 and 2010 was around 20%. The imperialist countries have also seen a decline in full-time self- employment and self-employed income. This has included a continuing shrinkage in the number of small family farmers, indicating the proletarianisation of portions of the lower middle classes. Michael Elsby’s study The Decline of US Labor Share reports that the “rise in inequality is even more striking for proprietors’ income than it is for payroll income. In 1948 the bottom 90% of employees earned 75% of payroll compensation. By 2010 this had declined to 54%. For entrepreneurial income, however, this fraction plummeted from 42% in 1948 to 14% in 2010.”[463] A separate study of 2014 data by the US Small Business Administration suggests the same pattern regarding millennials (generally defined as people born between 1985 and 2004). “Fewer than 4% of 30 year-olds reported they were in full-time self-employment – a proxy for entrepreneurship – compared with 5.4% of Generation X-ers [1965 and 1984] and 6.7% of Baby Boomers [1945 and 1964] at the same age,” the FT reported.[464] Furthermore, the pace of decline in wages has accelerated in recent years, “with the wage share falling more than 11 percentage points between 2002 and 2006. In China, the wage share declined by close to 10 percentage points since 2000.”[465] Africa’s workers saw their share of national income reduced by 15% in the two decades since 1990, again “with most of this decline – 10 percentage points – taking place since 2000. The decline is even more spectacular in north Africa, where the wage share fell by more than 30 percentage points after 2000.”[466] Latin America saw the lowest decline, of 10% since 1993, and most of it before 2000, undoubtedly due to strong workers’ organisation and resistance, represented by the left-wing ‘Pink Tide’ in Venezuela,[467] Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina. As mentioned, mainstream economic accounting methods underepresent the size of the middle classes and labour aristocracy – which are bound to be proportionately bigger in imperialist nations – and do not take account of sharply increasing inequality between skilled/professional and unskilled workers or of income to capital that has been classified as income to labour, such as bonuses paid to bankers and wages and sponsorship of sports professionals etc, meaning the real extent of the fall in labour’s share is even higher, and considerably so. Elsby attempts to challenge these distortions, writing that in the US, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) calculation of a decline of 3.9% in the share of national income for labour over 1987-2013 becomes a 10% decline when the highest paid 1% of employees are excluded, and a 14% decline when the highest paid 10% are excluded. Based on this more honest method, the lowest 90% of wage earners (84% of the US’s total economically active population) actually earned 42% of the total payroll in 1980 and just 28% in 2011. Elsby also found that the fall for labour has accelerated as time has progressed, declining by twice as much between 2000 and 2011 as in the previous two decades.[468] Again, the trend towards deepening proletarianisation is clear. The material basis for a position of relative privilege among the lower middle classes and labour aristocracy is disappearing. The proletariat is numerically stronger than ever, especially as an international class. ‘Neoliberal globalisation’, which promised to produce prosperous nations of entrepreneurs and homeowners, has instead produced capitalism’s grave-diggers. All this is confirmed by the fact that inequality has hit record levels. In 2018 and 2019, Oxfam found that the 26 richest billionaires owned as much in assets as the 3.8 billion people who make up the poorest half of the planet’s population. The number had been 61 in 2016 and 43 in 2017, showing again that capital continues to centralise. Marx wrote that the concentration of wealth at one pole depended on the concentration of poverty at the other. And lo: the wealth of more than 2,200 billionaires across the globe increased by $900bn in 2018, a 12% increase against a fall of 11% in the wealth of the poorest half of the world’s population. Between 1980 and 2015, the global economy grew by 380%, yet the number of people living in poverty on less than $5 (£3.20) a day increased by more than 1.1 billion. In 1980, $2.20 of every $100 went to the world’s poorest 20%, but in 2003 that figure had fallen to 60 cents.[469] Inequality is most acute between rich and poor countries but it is growing within rich countries as well. In the US, for example, according to the Federal Reserve, the richest 1% owned a record-high 38.6% of the country’s wealth in 2016, nearly twice as much as the bottom 90%. Anti-socialists will still ignore all this or proclaim that the proletariat is no longer a revolutionary class because living standards are generally much higher than 100 years ago, claiming that really “we are all middle class now” or making shallow observations such as “capitalism works because workers have mobile phones!” as if cracking some kind of insightful gotcha that disproves Marxism. This ignores how as the rate of exploitation increases, the value of necessary labour falls, making the commodities workers need to buy to live cheaper. It ignores how the needs of the working class change as capitalism develops: workers need smartphones and laptops in this day and age of 24-hour connectivity if they are even to be considered employable, and so the cost of a smartphone is included in the value of labour power. It also ignores that workers in some countries may have access to better infrastructure than in others (indeed, although no technology has ever scaled as quickly as the mobile phone, while five billion people now have mobile phones, only around 2.5 billion of world’s population presently have a smartphone). But most of all, it is ignorant of the fact that capitalism is breaking down, which will impoverish and radicalise the working class. The revolutionary power of the working class is latent.

**“No alternative” is an elite fallacy---political mobilization towards DPS is happening now---convincing people it’s a viable alternative is key**

**Grubačić et al. '20** [Andrej; 9/24/20; Professor and Department Chair of Social and Cultural Anthropology at California Institute of Integral Studies; Brett Wilkins, Bridget Meehan, Cynthia Peters, Don Rojas, Elena Herrada, Mark Evans, Medea Benjamin, Michael Albert, Noam Chomsky, Oscar Chacon, Paul Ortiz, Peter Bohmer, Savvina Chowdhury and Vincent Emanuel; "Greenwashing Capitalism Won’t Heal the Planet," https://truthout.org/articles/greenwashing-capitalism-wont-heal-the-planet/]

Our Future Must Be One Without Economic Growth

So focused on serving the needs of the wealthy elites, most governments, political leaders and policy-makers are stuck in the certainty that “**there is no alternative**” and their plans lie at the core of that belief. The proposals support “**business as usual**” with a coat of **greenwash** and a nip and tuck here and there. They **fail** to recognize that economic **growth** is in **direct conflict** with **decarbonization**, slowing down **global warming** or **redistributing wealth**, and that we must eliminate or vastly reduce certain activities altogether.

It is time to **expose** the **extreme fallacy** behind mainstream policy positions regarding the climate crisis. Decarbonization that will slow global warming is going to require **more than a few tweaks to the system** and nods to green investment. It will demand that we **jettison our current economic paradigm** altogether and replace it with a more **socialist**, **participatory** and **democratic** paradigm that puts social and environmental needs at its center and massively redistributes wealth. We are only kidding ourselves if we think it can happen any other way.

Many millions of us have already come to this realization. Recent polls conducted in Britain, for example, showed that just 6 percent wanted to go back to the economy as it was before the COVID-19 pandemic and 82 percent wanted to prioritize health and well-being over economic growth. Grassroots **activists** and **movements** are busy creating and implementing the **alternatives** to the status quo. “Ordinary” people are light-years ahead of the governments and political leaders in taking these courageous steps.

Despite the heroic efforts of everyday people working at localized levels, there are three hard truths we must face. The first is that our governments and political leaders are a major barrier. They may be pathetic but they hold the levers of power, albeit on behalf of the elites. The second hard truth is that efforts at localized levels are insufficient. Solving the climate crisis will necessitate the **end of capitalism** and that necessitates **action on a global scale** through global **coordination**, **planning** and **regulation**. Both of these truths, therefore, make it critical for our governments and leaders to catch up and start working for and with us.

#### Accelerating capitalist dysfunction lowers the bar---threshold for a successful transition is low

Monbiot 19 (George Monbiot, citing Erica Chenoweth - the Berthold Beitz Professor in Human Rights and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, Foreign Policy magazine ranked her among the Top 100 Global Thinkers in 2013 for her efforts to promote the empirical study of civil resistance, she received the Karl Deutsch Award, which the International Studies Association gives annually to the scholar under the age of 40 who has made the greatest impact on the field of international politics or peace research. And together with Maria J. Stephan, she won the 2013 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order, which is presented annually in recognition of outstanding proposals for creating a more just and peaceful world order. Their book, Why Civil Resistance Works, also won the 2012 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, given annually by the American Political Science Association in recognition of the best book on government, politics, or international affairs published in the U.S. in the previous calendar year. 4-1-2019, "Only rebellion will prevent an ecological apocalypse," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/15/rebellion-prevent-ecological-apocalypse-civil-disobedience> accessed: 8-29-2019) //bp

As the environmental crisis accelerates, and as protest movements like YouthStrike4Climate and Extinction Rebellion make it harder not to see what we face, people discover more inventive means of shutting their eyes and shedding responsibility. Underlying these excuses is a deep-rooted belief that if we really are in trouble, someone somewhere will come to our rescue: “they” won’t let it happen. But there is no they, just us. The political class, as anyone who has followed its progress over the past three years can surely now see, is chaotic, unwilling and, in isolation, strategically incapable of addressing even short-term crises, let alone a vast existential predicament. Yet a widespread and wilful naivety prevails: the belief that voting is the only political action required to change a system. Unless it is accompanied by the concentrated power of protest – articulating precise demands and creating space in which new political factions can grow – voting, while essential, remains a blunt and feeble instrument. The media, with a few exceptions, is actively hostile. Even when broadcasters cover these issues, they carefully avoid any mention of power, talking about environmental collapse as if it is driven by mysterious, passive forces, and proposing microscopic fixes for vast structural problems. The BBC’s Blue Planet Live series exemplified this tendency. Those who govern the nation and shape public discourse cannot be trusted with the preservation of life on Earth. There is no benign authority preserving us from harm. No one is coming to save us. None of us can justifiably avoid the call to come together to save ourselves. I see despair as another variety of disavowal. By throwing up our hands about the calamities that could one day afflict us, we disguise and distance them, converting concrete choices into indecipherable dread. We might relieve ourselves of moral agency by claiming that it’s already too late to act, but in doing so we condemn others to destitution or death. Catastrophe afflicts people now and, unlike those in the rich world who can still afford to wallow in despair, they are forced to respond in practical ways. In Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi, devastated by Cyclone Idai, in Syria, Libya and Yemen, where climate chaos has contributed to civil war, in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador,, where crop failure, drought and the collapse of fisheries have driven people from their homes, despair is not an option. Our inaction has forced them into action, as they respond to terrifying circumstances caused primarily by the rich world’s consumption. The Christians are right: despair is a sin. As the author Jeremy Lent points out in a recent essay, it is almost certainly too late to save some of the world’s great living wonders, such as coral reefs and monarch butterflies. It might also be too late to prevent many of the world’s most vulnerable people from losing their homes. But, he argues, with every increment of global heating, with every rise in material resource consumption, we will have to accept still greater losses, many of which can still be prevented through radical transformation. Every nonlinear transformation in history has taken people by surprise. As Alexei Yurchak explains in his book about the collapse of the Soviet Union – Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More – systems look immutable until they suddenly disintegrate. As soon as they do, the disintegration retrospectively looks inevitable. Our system – characterised by perpetual economic growth on a planet that is not growing – will inevitably implode. The only question is whether the transformation is planned or unplanned. Our task is to ensure it is planned, and fast. We need to conceive and build a new system based on the principle that every generation, everywhere has an equal right to enjoy natural wealth. This is less daunting than we might imagine. As Erica Chenoweth’s historical research reveals, for a peaceful mass movement to succeed, a maximum of 3.5% of the population needs to mobilise. Humans are ultra-social mammals, constantly if subliminally aware of shifting social currents. Once we perceive that the status quo has changed, we flip suddenly from support for one state of being to support for another. When a committed and vocal 3.5% unites behind the demand for a new system, the social avalanche that follows becomes irresistible. Giving up before we have reached this threshold is worse than despair: it is defeatism. Today, Extinction Rebellion takes to streets around the world in defence of our life-support systems. Through daring, disruptive, nonviolent action, it forces our environmental predicament on to the political agenda. Who are these people? Another “they”, who might rescue us from our follies? The success of this mobilisation depends on us. It will reach the critical threshold only if enough of us cast aside denial and despair, and join this exuberant, proliferating movement. The time for excuses is over. The struggle to overthrow our life-denying system has begun.

#### Merging theory with praxis is crucial---ideology is important, but can’t reverse causally mitigate the harms of capitalism without the plan

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Theorists, therefore, need to think beyond the logic of Capitalism and consider other alternatives for a future based on equity, solidarity and dignity for all human and non-human beings as utopian as this might appear in the short-run. Nonetheless, as Frankel (2018) postulates, “without new comprehensive socio-economic and environmental state roles to redefine socio-economic activity (Frankel, 2018: 285)”, the possibility of a post-growth or postcapitalist equitable society is barely inexistent. Here, it is of paramount importance to engage with the vague idea of “Climate X” (Wainwright & Mann, 2017). Although the concept still remains undertheorized, Climate X defines a world “that has defeated the emergent Climate Leviathan and its compulsion toward planetary sovereignty, while also transcending Capitalism” (Wainwright & Mann, 2017). As an X in an equation, Climate X calls for radical alternatives that no longer attach themselves to the fallacies of green Keynesianism, green extractivism, the owning of the Earth or elite politics of adaptation, leaving aside the less-wealthy. Climate X is, therefore, based on solidarity, equity and dignity for all human and non-human beings, tearing apart the logic of the Law of Cheap Nature that has enslaved most of the living entities and ecosystems of the planet for centuries.

Fighting the Necrocene implies solving the X. This would not only mean a good theoretical start to palliate its effects, but also a liberating and emancipating reality for areas that are victims of neoliberal hegemony, such as the Maldives. Nevertheless, any attempt to commit to strong egalitarianism, quality of work and work justice, radical democracy, solidarity and dignity for all needs to have the transgression of Capitalism as a necessary condition because Capitalism systematically contradicts the realization of such goals and the consequent real utopia of a sociopolitical system based on egalitarian-democratic values. Thus, the Necrocene needs to be perceived from an ecological rationality perspective that allows us to overcome the individualistic neoliberal self-centered logic which has colonized, destroyed and ideologically hegemonized social, cultural and scientific spheres. This ideological hegemony has, in turn, created the uncanny paradox between a hyper-rational system that is in fact profoundly irrational without giving space to alternatives that might allow us to get rid of it. Yet, what is crucial is that the Environmental Humanities and Political Ecology thinkers embrace the debate from a constructive, ecological rationality that understands the different knots of life, and beyond-green complexion of the needs of this multifocal crisis. Although the Necrocene is catastrophist to the core, it allows theorists to bring to the center of the discussion both the deathly nature of Capitalism, and the urgent necessity of a radical alternative to the most likely futures that will perpetuate business-as-usual with a greener image, dooming the less-wealthy.

The Maldives will be critically affected in a short time by the dramatic repercussions of the transgression of the Planetary Boundaries and the consequent disruption of knots of life and TimeSpaces that made the area thrive in cultural, financial and ecological terms. The Necrocene and the transgression of the Planetary Boundaries will detrimentally affect the less-wealthy first and, as a consequence, the ones that have collaborated the least with the transgression of such boundaries. Green Capitalism is, therefore, a fallacy that would sustain the business-as-usual logic and its inequalities. Thus, the Necrocene needs to be fought back from a theory and action perspective that fleshes out the contemporary in an inclusive way. It might help us secularize the sociopolitical sphere from the religious-like and unquestionable Capitalist hegemonic ideology through theory, activism, solidarity and hope, acknowledging the real threat of a psychopolitical, necrotic, capitalist realism. None of us knows what the world will look like in the near future. Nonetheless, in order to confront the Necrocene, we need to solve the X, and we need to solve it together.

#### Absent a specific mechanism to constrain nefarious corporate behavior, alternatives collapse into rule of the strongest

**Condit 15** [Celeste, Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,” Feb 4, 2015, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Volume 101, Issue 1, 2015]

The theories of social change that dominated American Communication Studies at the close of the twentieth century echoed those of the Western humanities. These theories spurred extensive thought about the performances of individual identity and the relationship of identity to mass media and culture, and they probably had some laudable influence on the broader culture. They are, however, inadequate to the evolving contexts I have described. One can sum up the most widely circulating theories of social change among “critical social theorists” of the twentieth century in the following, admittedly simplified, statement: There is an (evil) Totality (fill in the blank with one or more: patriarchy, whites, the West, the U.S., neo-liberalism, global capitalism) that must be overturned by a Radical Revolution. We don't know the shape of what will come after the Revolution, but The Evil is a construction of the Totality, so anything that comes after will be better. All you need is … (fill in the blank: Love, Courage, Violence, etc.). For an example, read Slavoj Žižek's attack on the evil Totality (“capitalism,”5 pp. 41/49), which requires the “excess” of violence named as “courage”6 (pp. 75, 78, 79), via “a leap”7 (p. 81), to eliminate “democracy” for a yet-to-be-imagined “new collectivity” (p. 85).8 The resilience of this social theory identifies it as a rhetorical attractor; a predispositional symbolic set that readily transmits emotive potency. To appropriate Kenneth Burke's terms, the bio-symbolics of human political relationships readily create a “grammar” and “rhetoric” in the form of a unified enemy that can be imagined as defeated in a singular battle, after which, things in “our” tribe may be harmonious. To identify this fantasy theme in this way is to suggest that it may not merely be the product of “Western” or “capitalist” imaginations, but rather that it arises from an intersection of the structural characteristics of language systems and the nature of human biologies (which readily adopt both tribal social cooperation and inter-tribal competition). Because neither biology nor symbolics are deterministic systems, this fantasy theme is avoidable, even if it is powerfully attractive. Because both biology and symbolics are material, however, specific kinds of work are necessary in order to avoid the lure of that predisposition. This point is crucial, because it invalidates the twentieth century (idealist) approaches to social change, which envisioned a single (violent) leap away from the social as sufficient to create and maintain better worlds. Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

#### Raising the threat level is important---key to spur individual and institutional action

Veldman 12 – PhD Candidate Religion and Nature at U of Florida (Robin- National Foundation Fellow at the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship, Spring, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists” Ethics and the Environment, Vol 17 No 1, ProjectMuse)

Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation. National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior. When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper monkeywrenching” (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together. The connection between belief in impending disaster and environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting “dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior: images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212) What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative. All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8] The Apocalyptic Narrative as a Framework for Moral Deliberation In discussing how apocalypticism functions within the environmental community, it will be helpful to analyze it as a type of narrative. I do so because the domain of narrative includes both the stories that people read and write, as well as those they tell and live by. By using narratives as data, scholars can analyze experiential and textual sources simultaneously (Polkinghorne 1988; Riessman 2000). To analyze environmental apocalypticism as a type of narrative is not to suggest that apocalyptics’ claims about the future are fictional. Rather, it is to highlight that the facts to which environmentalists appeal have been organized with particular goals in mind, goals which have necessarily shaped the selection and presentation of those facts. Compelling environmental writers do not simply list every known fact pertaining to the natural world, but instead select certain findings and place them within a larger interpretive framework. Alone, each fact has little meaning, but when woven into a larger narrative, a message emerges. This process of narrativization is essential if a message is to be persuasive (Killingsworth and Palmer 2000, 197), and has occurred not only in the rapidly expanding genre of environmental nonfiction, but in much scientific writing about the environment as well (Harré, Brockmeier, and Mühlhäusler 1999, 69). What defines narratives as such is their beginning-middle-end structure, their ability to “describe an action that begins, continues over a well-defined period of time, and finally draws to a definite close” (Cronon 1992, 1367). Here I will focus on the last of these elements, the ending, because anything we can learn about how endings function within narratives in general will be applicable to the apocalypse, the most final ending of all. An ending is essential in order for a story to be complete, but there is more to it than this. Endings are also key because they establish a story’s moral, the lesson it is supposed to impart upon the reader. In other words, to know the moral of the story, auditors must know the consequences of the actions depicted therein, so there can be no moral without an ending. To take a simple example, when we hear the story of the shepherd boy who falsely claims that a wolf is attacking his flock of sheep in order to entertain himself at his community’s expense, what makes the lesson clear is that when a wolf does attack his flock, the disenchanted town members refuse to come to his aid. By clearly illustrating how telling lies can have [End Page 9] unpleasant consequences for the perpetrator, the ending reveals the moral that lying is wrong. As Cronon explains, it is “[t]he difference between beginning and end [that] gives us our chance to extract a moral from the rhetorical landscape” (1992, 1370). Endings play a similar role in environmental stories. In Al Gore’s book Earth in the Balance (1992), for example, he devotes over a third of the book’s pages to presenting scientific evidence that disaster is imminent.5 As he sums it up, “Modern industrial civilization…is colliding violently with our planet’s ecological system. The ferocity of its assault on the earth is breathtaking, and the horrific consequences are occurring so quickly as to defy our capacity to recognize them” (1992, 269). He builds this argument so carefully precisely because if the ending does not seem credible, the moral he wants readers to draw from the story will not be compelling. If his readers are not convinced that the ending to this story of ecological misbehavior will be a debacle of colossal proportions, they will not become convinced that they need to dramatically alter their ecological behavior. Thus the vision of future catastrophe that Gore presents provides a crucial vantage point from which the present environmental situation can be understood as the result of a grand moral failure, and Gore’s readers are made aware of their obligations in light of it. Gore himself appreciates the importance of this recognition, arguing that “whether we realize it or not, we are now engaged in an epic battle to right the balance of our earth, and the tide of this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join an all-out effort” (1992, 269, emphasis added). Here, as in so many other stories, the ending must be in place for the moral to become clear. To say that endings are essential in order for stories to have morals is already to hint that stories alter behavior, that they can encourage action in the real world even as they invoke an imaginary one. This much is clear from Earth in the Balance (1992): Gore does not just want people to grasp a moral, to perceive some ethic in the abstract—he wants them change their behavior in the here and now. In constructing a narrative with this goal in mind, he is banking on the ability of powerful stories to motivate social change, to be, as Cronon puts it, “our chief moral compass in the world” (1992, 1375). Mark Johnson’s insightful synthesis of cognitive science and philosophy helps explain further how this process of moral guidance occurs. For [End Page 10] Johnson, narrative is fundamental to our experience of reality, “the most comprehensive means we have for constructing temporal syntheses that bind together and unify our past, present, and future into more or less meaningful patterns” (1993, 174). Narratives are also critical to our ability to reason morally, an activity which Johnson asserts is fundamentally imaginative. In this view, we use stories to imagine ourselves in different scenarios, exploring and evaluating the consequences of different possible actions in order to determine the right one. Moral deliberation is thus …an imaginative exploration of the possibilities for constructive action within a present situation. We have a problem to solve here and now (e.g., ‘What am I to do?’…. ‘How should I treat others?’), and we must try out various possible continuations of our narrative in search of the one that seems best to resolve the indeterminacy of our present situation. (1993, 180) Put another way, what cognitive science has revealed is that from an empirical perspective the process of moral deliberation entails constructing narratives rooted in our unique history and circumstances, rather than applying universal principles (such as Kant’s categorical imperative) to particular cases. That we use narratives to reason morally is not a result of conscious choice but of how human cognition works. That is, insofar as we experience ourselves as temporal beings, a narrative framework is necessary to organize, explain, and ultimately justify the many individual decisions that over time become a life. Formal principles may be useful in unambiguous textbook cases, but in real life “we can almost never decide (reflectively) how to act without considering the ways in which we can continue our narrative construction of our situation” (Johnson 1993, 160). Empirically speaking, “our moral reasoning is situated within our narrative understanding” (Johnson 1993, 180, italics in original). The observation that people use narratives to reason morally may help explain the association between environmental apocalypticism and activism. The function of the apocalyptic narrative may be that it helps adherents determine how to act by **providing a storyline** from which they can imaginatively sample, enabling them to assess the consequences of their actions. In order to answer the question, “Should I drive or walk to the store?” for example, they can reason, “If I walk, that will reduce my carbon footprint, which will help keep the ice caps from melting, saving humans and other species.” It is their access to this narrative of impending [End Page 11] disaster that makes such reasoning possible, for it provides a simple framework within which people can consider and eventually arrive at some conclusion about their moral obligations.6 More broadly, it can guide entire lives by providing a narrative frame of reference that imbues the individual’s experiences with meaning. For example, it is the context of looming anthropogenic apocalypse which suggests that dedicating one’s life to achieving a healthier relationship with the natural world is a worthwhile endeavor. Absent the apocalypse, choices such as limiting one’s travel to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, becoming vegetarian, working in the environmental sector (often for less compensation), or growing one’s own food could seem to be meaningless sacrifices. Within this context, on the other hand, such choices become essential features of the quest to live a moral life. The apocalyptic narrative is but one of many ways to tell the environmental story, yet it is one that seems particularly well-suited to encouraging pro-environmental behavior. First, the apocalyptic ending discloses certain everyday decisions as moral decisions. Without the narrative context of impending disaster, decisions such as whether to drive or walk to the store would be merely matters of convenience or preference. In the context of potentially disastrous consequences for valued places, people, and organisms, by contrast, such decisions become matters of right and wrong. Second, putting information about the environment into narrative form enables apocalyptics to link complex global environmental processes to their own lives, a perceptual technique Thomashow describes as “bringing the biosphere home” (2002). Developing this skill is essential because without that felt sense of connection to their own lived experience, people are much less likely to become convinced that it is incumbent upon them to act (2002, 2). Finally, the sheer magnitude of the impending disaster increases the feeling of responsibility to make good on one’s moral intuitions. By locating individuals within a drama of ultimate concern, the narrative frames their choices as cosmically important, and this feeling of urgency then helps to convert moral deliberation into action. With this conceptual overview in place, we can now examine more closely what the relationship between apocalypticism and moral reasoning looks like in practice. [End Page 12]

#### Securitization of the climate causes cooperation, not militarism---reps are shaped by context

Keating 13 Joshua E. Keating, associate editor at Foreign Policy, “Terror Management,” Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/terror-management/>, March 4 2013

REFLECTING ON U.S.-Soviet relations late in his presidency, Ronald Reagan once mused about one thing that could unite humanity: a threat from a "power from outer space." At the time, the sci-fi reference seemed a little out of place in a discussion about international relations, but the Gipper had a point: Bitter rivals don't tend to unite unless they face a common threat from a third party. Think of the U.S.-Soviet alliance against Nazi Germany, the period of bipartisan consensus that followed the 9/11 attacks on the United States—or, more to Reagan's point, the now clichéd scene of mortal enemies putting aside their differences in alien-invasion movies. (Remember the Arab and Israeli pilots who join forces near the end of Independence Day}) Some psychologists, however, now suggest we may not have to wait for flying saucers in our search for a global threat that can bring humanity together —we may already have created one ourselves in the form of hotter temperatures, rising sea levels, and increasingly unpredictable weather. According to a recent article in Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, just hearing about the dangers posed by global warming can turn you into a pacifist. The study was led by University of Colorado professor Tom Pyszczynski, one of the leading proponents of an emerging school of social psychology known as "terror management theory," which holds that a wide array of human behavior and thought is motivated by fear of death. In this case, a common fear of the dangers of climate change, he argues, can lead to global cooperation. "When you think of yourself as facing a shared enemy and a shared threat, it brings people together," Pyszczynski says. Ironically, defense strategists have been warning for years of exactly the opposite scenario when it comes to global warming: that a new world of extreme weather and rising seas could usher in a new age of confrontation as countries compete for increasingly scarce resources and habitable land. More recently, a 2012 report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council forecast that, by 2030, climate change could spawn this kind of conflict in developing and fragile states. Still, Pyszczynski is no starry-eyed optimist. "My guess is that as things get worse, people will come together and a consensus will emerge, but by then it may be too late," he says. Then again, in disaster movies enemies always unite just in time to fight off the bad guys.

# 2AC

## K

### 2AC---Perm

#### Perm do both---the neg must prove the alternative is functionally competitive---anything else amplifies capitalist splintering tactics and dooms inter-movement cooperation necessary to displace capitalism

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 5-6)

The contradiction of capitalism is that it is an uncompromising structure of negotiation. It ruthlessly absorbs sociohistorical limits and the challenges these limits pose to capital, placing them in the service of further capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is an exclusive system premised upon the logic of property rights and the expansion of these rights, all the while maintaining that the free market is self-regulating, sufficiently and efficiently working to establish individual and collective well-being. In reality, however, socioeconomic disparities have become more acute the world over, and the world's "common wealth,” as David Bollier and later Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, has been increasingly privatized.12 In 2010, the financial wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals (with investable assets of $1 to $50 million or more [all money amounts are in U.S. dollars] ) surpassed the 2007 pre-financial crisis peak, growing 9.7 percent and reaching $42.7 trillion. Also in 2010 the global population of high-net­ worth individuals grew 8.3 percent to 10.9 million.13 In 2010, the global population was 6.9 billion, of whom there were 1,000 billionaires; 80,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals with average wealth exceeding $50 mil­ lion; 3 billion with an average wealth of $10,000, of which 1.1 billion owned less than $1,000; and 2.5 billion who were reportedly "unbanked'' (without a bank account and thus living on the margins of the formal financial system) .14 In a world where financial advantage brings with it political benefits, these figures attest to the weak position the majority of the world occupies in the arena of environmental and climate change politics. Neoliberal capitalism ameliorates the threat posed by environmental change by taking control of the collective call it issues forth, splintering the collective into a disparate and confusing array of individual choices competing with one another over how best to solve the crisis. Through this process of competition, the collective nature of the crisis is restructured and privatized, then put to work for the production and circulation of capital as the average wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals grows at the expense of the majority of the world living in abject poverty. Advocating that the free market can solve debilitating environmental changes and the climate crisis is not a political response to these problems; it is merely a political ghost emptied of its collective aspirations.

### 2AC---AT: Science K

#### Epistemic experimentation at the cost of empirically testable science causes extinction.

Coyne, 06 – Author and Writer for the Times (Jerry A., “A plea for empiricism”, FOLLIES OF THE WISE, Dissenting essays, 405pp. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker and Hoard, 1 59376 101 5)

Supernatural forces and events, essential aspects of most religions, play no role in science, not because we exclude them deliberately, but because they have never been a useful way to understand nature. Scientific “truths” are empirically supported observations agreed on by different observers. Religious “truths,” on the other hand, are personal, unverifiable and contested by those of different faiths. Science is nonsectarian: those who disagree on scientific issues do not blow each other up. Science encourages doubt; most religions quash it. But religion is not completely separable from science. Virtually all religions make improbable claims that are in principle empirically testable, and thus within the domain of science: Mary, in Catholic teaching, was bodily taken to heaven, while Muhammad rode up on a white horse; and Jesus (born of a virgin) came back from the dead. None of these claims has been corroborated, and while science would never accept them as true without evidence, religion does. A mind that accepts both science and religion is thus a mind in conflict. Yet scientists, especially beleaguered American evolutionists, need the support of the many faithful who respect science. It is not politically or tactically useful to point out the fundamental and unbreachable gaps between science and theology. Indeed, scientists and philosophers have written many books (equivalents of Leibnizian theodicy) desperately trying to show how these areas can happily cohabit. In his essay, “Darwin goes to Sunday School”, Crews reviews several of these works, pointing out with brio the intellectual contortions and dishonesties involved in harmonizing religion and science. Assessing work by the evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould, the philosopher Michael Ruse, the theologian John Haught and others, Crews concludes, “When coldly examined . . . these productions invariably prove to have adulterated scientific doctrine or to have emptied religious dogma of its commonly accepted meaning”. Rather than suggesting any solution (indeed, there is none save adopting a form of “religion” that makes no untenable empirical claims), Crews points out the dangers to the survival of our planet arising from a rejection of Darwinism. Such rejection promotes apathy towards overpopulation, pollution, deforestation and other environmental crimes: “So long as we regard ourselves as creatures apart who need only repent of our personal sins to retain heaven’s blessing, we won’t take the full measure of our species-wise responsibility for these calamities”. Crews includes three final essays on deconstruction and other misguided movements in literary theory. These also show “follies of the wise” in that they involve interpretations of texts that are unanchored by evidence. Fortunately, the harm inflicted by Lacan and his epigones is limited to the good judgement of professors of literature. Follies of the Wise is one of the most refreshing and edifying collections of essays in recent years. Much like Christopher Hitchens in the UK, Crews serves a vital function as National Sceptic. He ends on a ringing note: “The human race has produced only one successfully validated epistemology, characterizing all scrupulous inquiry into the real world, from quarks to poems. It is, simply, empiricism, or the submitting of propositions to the arbitration of evidence that is acknowledged to be such by all of the contending parties. Ideas that claim immunity from such review, whether because of mystical faith or privileged “clinical insight” or the say-so of eminent authorities, are not to be countenanced until they can pass the same skeptical ordeal to which all other contenders are subjected.” As science in America becomes ever more harried and debased by politics and religion, we desperately need to heed Crews’s plea for empiricism.

### 2AC---AT: Violence

**Strategic nonviolence is better – spurs regime breakdown, increases participation, and spurs international condemnation – stats prove violence fails**

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Strategic nonviolent resistance can be distinguished from principled nonviolence, which is grounded in religious and ethically based injunctions against violence. Although many people who are committed to principled nonviolence have engaged in nonviolent resistance (e.g., Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.), the vast majority of participants in nonviolent struggles have not been devoted to principled nonviolence.11 The **conflation** of nonviolent struggle with principled nonviolence, pacifism, passivity, weakness, or isolated street protests has contributed to **misconceptions** about this phenomenon.12 Although nonviolent resistors eschew the threat or use of violence, the “peaceful” designation often given to nonviolent movements **belies the often highly disruptive nature of organized nonviolent resistance**. Nonviolent resistance achieves demands **against the will of the opponent by seizing control of the conflict through widespread noncooperation and defiance**.13 Violent coercion threatens physical violence against the opponent.14 Scholars often **assume** that violent methods of resistance are the most coercive or the most likely to force accommodation, thereby producing desired policy changes.15 For instance, some have argued that terrorism is an effective strategy, particularly in forcing democratic regimes to make territorial concessions.16 In contrast, Max Abrahms has shown that terrorists’ success rates are extremely low, accomplishing their policy objectives **only 7 percent of the time**.17 Abrahms nevertheless concludes that actors choose terrorism because it is still more effective than nonviolent resistance.18 We argue that nonviolent resistance may have a **strategic advantage over violent resistance** for two reasons. **First**, repressing nonviolent campaigns may **backfire**. In backfire, an unjust act—often violent repression—recoils against its originators, often resulting in the **breakdown of obedience among regime supporters**, **mobilization** of the population against the regime, and **international condemnation** of the regime.19 The internal and external costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns are thus higher than the costs of repressing violent campaigns. Backfire leads to power shifts by increasing the internal solidarity of the resistance campaign, creating **dissent and conflicts among the opponent’s supporters**, increasing **external support** for the resistance campaign, and **decreasing external support** for the opponent. These dynamics are **more likely to occur** when an opponent’s violence is not met with violent counterreprisals by the resistance campaign and when this is communicated to internal and external audiences.20 The domestic and international repercussions of a violent crackdown against civilians who have publicized their commitment to nonviolent action are **more severe** than repression against those who could be **credibly labeled as “terrorists” or “violent insurgents.”**21 Internally, members of a regime—including civil servants, security forces, and members of the judiciary—are more likely to shift loyalty toward nonviolent opposition groups than toward violent opposition groups. The coercive power of any resistance campaign is enhanced by its tendency to prompt disobedience and defections by members of the opponent’s security forces, who are more likely to consider the negative political and personal consequences of using repressive violence against unarmed demonstrators than against armed insurgents.22 Divisions are more likely to result among erstwhile regime supporters, who are **not as prepared** to deal with mass civil resistance as they are with armed insurgents.23 Regime repression can also **backfire** through increased public mobilization. Actively involving a relatively larger number of people in the nonviolent campaign may bring **greater** and **more sustained pressure to bear** on the target, whereas the public may **eschew violent insurgencies** because of physical or moral barriers. Externally, the international community is **more likely to denounce and sanction** states for repressing nonviolent campaigns than it is violent campaigns. When nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sympathize with the cause, nonviolent campaigns are more appealing as aid recipients. External aid may or may not advance the cause of the campaign.24 The external costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns can be high, however, especially when the repression is captured by the media. External actors may organize sanctions against repressive regimes that repeatedly crack down on unarmed protestors.25 Although sanctions are possible in the case of violent insurgencies as well, they are less likely. Instead, some foreign states may actually aid a regime in crushing the violent insurgents. Other foreign states may lend material support to a violent resistance campaign in an attempt to advantage it against its opponent. Indeed, state sponsorship of violent insurgencies and terrorist groups has been an ongoing foreign policy dilemma for decades.26 Whether state-sponsored violent groups have succeeded in obtaining their strategic goals is unclear.

#### Emprics prove

**Saba 15**, (PhD in political science from University College Dublin and lectures in international relations in Ramon Llull University. Claudia has over five years’ experience in advocacy work on Palestine. In 2011 she acted as media spokesperson for Irish Ship to Gaza, the Irish segment of the Freedom Flotilla, Palestinian armed resistance: the absent critique, [www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Issue-7-2-Saba.pdf](http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Issue-7-2-Saba.pdf))

The absent critique The critique that one would hope to find among activists is around the **effects** of armed resistance both on Palestinian lives and on thePalestinian cause. The two are not necessarily the same and a positive contribution by armed resistance to the Palestinian cause may work to justify its disastrous results on Palestinian lives. However, I would argue that armed resistance has neither advanced the Palestinian cause nor protected Palestinian lives. On the contrary, it may have **strengthened Israel's hand to crush the Palestinians with impunity**. Ever since Hamas became confined to the Gaza Strip it has pursued the "cause" through inter alia armed means. It made no gains from this in the form of concessions from Israel; it did not liberate an inch of land and it did not reverseIsrael's cruel siege of Gaza. Meanwhile life in Gaza has **severely deteriorated** as a result of repeated military confrontations with Israel. Israel's latest war on Gaza "**eliminated what was left of the middle class**" and sent "**almost all of the population into destitution** and dependence on international humanitarian aid" (UNCTAD, 2015: 8). Compounding Israel's policies towards Palestinian infrastructure, environment and natural resources, which had rendered Gaza nearly uninhabitable (United Nations, 2012), the armed resistance has proven **immensely costly** to the Palestinians. As such, one might expect an energetic debate about it among those involved in advocating for Palestinian rights. For example, efforts could be made to amplify the voices of Palestinians opposed to armed resistance. Campaigns could be launched to publicly dissociate from Hamas's and other armed groups' tactics so as to discourage support for their methods. In particular a debate could be extended on the use of nonviolence for the attainment of political goals, as famously put forth by Gene Sharp (1973). Maintaining nonviolent discipline, according to Sharp's theory of "political jiu-jitsu", can bolster the view that Israel's treatment of the Palestinians is deeply unfair and must be countered. When Hamas launches rockets at Israel it **diminishes perceptions** of the conflict as lopsided; indeed the rockets may give the false impression that Palestinians can defend themselves. Yes, of course Israel would find ways to undermine an exclusively nonviolent resistance strategy -- oppressive regimes often do. Here advancements in nonviolent theory such as the "backfire" method whereby activists anticipate the oppressor's response to nonviolent mobilzation and **take action to make it backfire** could be discussed by activists (Martin, 2015). And although usual acts of nonviolent resistance such as demonstrations, boycotts and sit-ins would not work in Gaza since it is deprived of direct contact with Israel and the world, alternative acts of protest and civil disobedience could be explored and made possible by collaboration with activists on the outside through the use of information technologies and other means. Moreover, debates with regard to activists' vision for the cause must interrogate the role of armed resistance. Many activists have proposed a vision of a single state in Israel/Palestine in which all would enjoy equal social and political rights while at the same time ensuring just redress for injustices incurred (Abunimah et al, 2007). Although many SMOs engaged in the movement do not officially take a position on the one/two-state debate, campaigners have increasingly argued that the two-state solution is no longer attainable given the number of Israeli settlements in Palestinian areas. In this context, conferences advocating for one democratic state have become more common (Farsakh, 2011)1. Debates in this area remain at the theoretical level and have not defined the means of reaching the one state goal. The continuation of armed confrontation between Israel and Palestinian groups is likely detrimental to the prospects of a single democratic state. However this, to my knowledge, has not been addressed. On the contrary, there is confusing discourse around campaigns such as BDS that seems to leave the door open to armed resistance. For example, in an assessment of BDS in the Palestinian publication Al Majdal, one author warned of the "dogma" of nonviolence that could come to plague BDS and asserted that "violent and nonviolent tactics have always co-existed as forms of resistance and they are likely to do so in the future" (Sultany, 2013: 15-16). Nonviolent discourse among Palestine activists, according to Sultany, "has become more fashionable today since it resonates with Western perspectives" (Sultany, 2013: 15). This sort of talk **needs to be challenged** by a healthy and rigorous debate on the real merits of committing to unarmed methods. I provide further examples of Arab commentators who criticize nonviolence in a later section. For now, suffice it to say that **evading criticism** of armed resistance has become the norm among many people active in the movement, as I demonstrate in the next section.

#### Insurrection fails and makes the state stronger

Luke 2015 (TW[University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg], 10/29/15, “On Insurrectionality: Theses on Contemporary Revolts and Resilience”, Globalizations, Volume 12, 2015 - Issue 6, Taylor and Francis, accessed 9/19/16) JA

With the militarization of municipal, regional and national police forces in the USA and other OECD countries (one here can think about the overly aggressive display of military-grade weaponry in response at Ferguson, Missouri or Keene, New Hampshire to civil rights protest or student mayhem that was not wholly unlike that of Egyptian military and police forces in Tahrir Square), new global trends of social control and organization, rooted in resilient styles of governance, are gelling in the turbulence of insurrectionality. Add to these rapid response forces, the securitized surveillance system of closed-circuit television, cybertracking, biometric scanning, and addressable individual tracking devices; and, the withering away of many other streams of popular ideological resistance as corrective feedback loops, the powers that be, have been, and will be seem, if they are truly sophisticated, to be adding insurrection to their risk society calculi. Indeed, these new integers for innovation justify building and enforcing a potent mix of resilience tactics, which are tested as ideology and practice for continued elite empowerment. Rising up in the streets against authority in the fury of intense insurrection is acceptable, but standing up slowly to truly assume power has become much less likely. Still, the collapse of economic growth, the decay of middle and working class job opportunities, civic infrastructure decay, loss of public goods, and degradation of private markets are all generating and maintaining a high level of insurrectional energy (Luke, 2012 Luke, T. W. (2012). “Informatic spatiality, electronic agency, cybernetic structure and the new people power: Occupy movements at play in network systems,” Fast Capitalism, 9(1). Retrieved from www.fastcapitalism.com. ). Now the elite discourses embedded in the reproduction of existing power structures knowingly accedes to insurrection, and even can concede conceptually, its justifiable bases, which endorses its existence as ‘insurrectionable development'. Instead of a ‘clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996 Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of order. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. ), these arrangements for a resilient adaptation to recurrent anarchy are the nuts and bolts needed for ‘governing the present' (Miller & Rose, 2008 Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008). Governing the present: Administering economic, social and personal life. Cambridge: Polity. ). Governance games on this scale harness legitimate corrective impulses from the outsiders, underclasses, and superfluous populace to make improvements in some state and non-state services, which usually enhance systemic resilience, regime stability, and the sustainability of ruling alliance/elite/bloc/class power (Guattari & Negri, 2010 Guattari, F. & Negri, A. (2010). New lines of alliance, new spaces of liberty. Brooklyn, NY: Automedia. ). Are insurrections—both peaceful and violent instances of direct action—crucial opportunities for policy innovations? They seem to appear as fluid zones of indeterminate determination where layers of opposition and acceptance arguably are ‘at once economic, political, and cultural—and hence they are biopolitical struggles, struggles over the forms of life … creating new public spaces and new forms of community' (Hardt & Negri, 2000 Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. , p. 56). Likewise, do insurrections reconfigure ‘the organization of the social worker and immaterial labor' in which ‘bodies are on the front lines of this battle, bodies that consolidate in an irreversible way the results of past struggles and incorporate a power that has been gained ontologically' (Hardt & Negri, 2000 Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. , p. 410) stand ready to OWS, but are they also truly unable to ever manage Wall Street? Along these lines, insurrection becomes yet one more reflexive dimension of modernity's disciplinary modulations of individual and collective human life. State authority rationally maps, and then manages the degrees of freedom allowed in the life of its subjects or citizens through the dispositifs at work in many embedded institutions woven into the territorial fabric of states. The command and control containments of these degrees of unruly freedom, which are clearly allowed to human life by state power, unevenly meld sovereignty, territoriality, and population as new resistant-and-resilient coproductions of governmentality (Foucault, 1978 Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality, volume I: An introduction. New York, NY: Random House. ). Hence, resilience-ready rulers often use popular direct action effectively to ensnare the population in ‘apparatuses of security', like those created by various police forces, homeland security units, public health measures, etc., in a manner such that these events also address ‘health, education and social welfare systems and the mechanisms of the management of the national economy' (Dean, 1999 Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. London: Sage. , p. 20). In turn, can these governmentalizations of insurrectionable developments settle into ‘the juridical and administrative apparatuses of the state in all of the ways that optimize the health, welfare and life of populations' as biopolitical formations (Dean, 1999 Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. London: Sage. , p. 20)? Quite clearly, this complex style of resilient response must be studied, since the emergent regimentations of governance practices have ‘a technical or technological dimension' with new adaptive strategies that display ‘characteristic techniques, instrumentalities and mechanisms through which such practices operate, by which they attempt to realize their goals, and through which they have a range of effects' (Dean, 1999 Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. London: Sage. , p. 21). Seeing insurrectionality as a tactical move for the defense of fluid, global and unstable public order follows from Foucault's vision of the apparatuses of government. The problematization of insurrectionable developments as constructive moments of collective purpose seconds his sense of the world today, namely,  … not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism. (Foucault, 1997 Foucault, M. (1997). The essential works, 1954–1984, vol. 1 ethics, subjectivity and truth (Paul Rabinow, Ed.). New York, NY: The New Press. , p. 256) The division of social forces into ‘insurrectionists' that are continuously tracked by ‘anti-insurrectionist' security assessment experts, working as ‘threat assessment teams' to assay ‘teeming assessable threats' confirms this consciousness of everything merely being dangerous, and thereby producing a fluid new social order out of constant flexible imperatives that assure all they will have ‘something to do'. Strangely, ‘endangerment' becomes a new operational baseline assumption for making the advances of ‘development'. Are these strategies leading to more secure order, or only securitizing everyday life to accustom citizens to living on the minimal basis they appear to accept? They are unruly wards protected by quasi-police state power, who permit the public to protest the conditions of their confinement in advocacy networks within and across borders, but always remain at the mercy of the same resilient power practitioners (Keck & Sikkink, 1998 Keck, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ). Ironically, insurrectionality serves multiple purposes; but, most importantly, its practices sustain resilient state networks for ruling elites, and this link cultivates the expected outcomes—a barely passable life for the masses trapped in shells of passivity, dependency, and inaction that remarkably are regarded by far too many citizens, clients or consumers as the freedoms of insurrectional agency.

#### Acting totally outside of the state fails

King, 16—has been active in campaigning for refugee rights and against border controls for over a decade, has taught at the University of Nottingham and worked as a caseworker with the British Refugee Council (Natasha, *No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance* pg 39-42, dml)

But to what extent are these experiments in autonomy ever entirely autonomous? In response to Richard Day’s book on the newest social movements, Richard Thompson argues that it’s unrealistic to talk about creating wholly autonomous social structures because ‘[t]he second they’re consequential is the second they’ll be noticed [by the state]. At that point, it becomes impossible to break the cycle of antagonism by will alone. They will come after us’ (Thompson n.d., emphasis added). In other words, experiments in autonomy are rarely (if ever) entirely free from a relation to the state, or from state antagonism, and we are rarely able to ignore that antagonism. We mayantagonize the state, but we are forced also to respond to the state, as a form of self-defence. This has happened time and time again, from the steady illegalization of squatting in Europe, and the tightening of laws around private property, to the infiltration by the CIA of the Black Panther movement, to the struggle between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state. We see this in the struggle for the freedom of movement when, continuing with the examples above, the EU employs Frontex special missions on the Turkish/Greek borders, or when the living spaces of people without papers are raided or destroyed.¶ Whether people have been forced to, or they have seen it as the best strategy, the history of struggles for liberation has been one that included demands on the state. Often this has taken the form of engagement in a politics of rights and/or recognition. From the movement of the Sans Papiers in France, to ‘a Day without Migrants’ in the USA; from campaigns that fight against the detention and deportation of people without papers, to struggles against police violence, resistance through forms of visible collective action have been central to struggles against the border. In most cases such struggles have made demands on the state, particularly through seeking recognition as a group, and through making claims to rights. But to what extent are demands for rights and/or recognition part of a no borders politics? ¶ Demands for rights and recognition have played a big part in the struggle for the freedom of movement. Yet there has been a long history of criticism over the politics of citizenship. Rights claims, for example, have been seen as essentially reinforcing the role of the state as the benefactor and grantor of rights, and reinforcing the notion that rights represent entitlements applicable to those who fit certain descriptions of being a human (cf. Arendt 1973 [1951]; Barbagallo and Beuret 2008; Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010; Elam 1994). From this perspective, demands for rights and representation amount to disputes over the allocation of equality and therefore can only ever achieve a redistribution of that equality, rather than undermining the idea that equality is somehow qualified in the first place. As Imogen Tyler says, ‘[c]itizenship is a famously exclusionary concept, and its exclusionary force is there by design. The exclusions of citizenship are immanent to its logic, and not at all accidental. Citizenship is meant to produce successful and unsuccessful subjects. Citizenship, in other words, is “designed to fail”’ (Tyler, quoted in Nyers 2015: 31). ¶ Similar variations of this critique have appeared in the autonomy of migration debate. Representation can also be thought of as a bordering technology that seeks to pacify and discipline expressions of autonomy (or attempts at escape) (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). In other words, the politics of citizenship is problematic because it only ever brings people into the state. ‘Of course migrants become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights, but the demands of migrants and the dynamics of migration cannot be exhausted in the quest for visibility and rights’ (ibid.: 219).¶ I have a lot of sympathy with these arguments, and because of them am extremely suspicious of a politics of citizenship. But when it comes to actual practices of struggle against the border, a resolute stand against such strategies seems naïve, and insulting to those who have taken part. Migrant-led struggles have often been claims for rights, and ultimately I don’t want to dismiss such practices because they are philosophically problematic. In fact, sometimes to appeal to rights or recognition is the only available strategy in situations of extreme vulnerability, where people’s options are highly limited. Recognizing that we are in relations of power right now means also recognizing that our situation is imperfect and that we have to struggle in our (imperfect) reality. Youssef, a long-time activist for the freedom of movement in Greece, himself of North African descent, talked about the need for pragmatism in tactics; that sometimes we must engage with the state in order to bring about greater freedoms now. ‘Today, in Creta, in Chania, they will catch five people. How can I take them from the jail? I have something in the police station, OK. I have to talk with them today. OK? But tomorrow I can fuck him. He’s not my friend. He’s not my comrade. OK. We are talking today. Tomorrow we are fucking’ (interview, Youssef). His statement reflects how many practices that refuse the border often come out of necessity. In other words they’re rarely part of some intentional or ‘noble’ act to become a rights-bearer, say, and more often pragmatic decisions based on the need to alleviate immediate situations of oppression. ¶ A no borders politics seeks to go beyond claims to representation and rights that ultimately stand to reinforce the state. But claims to representation and rights can sometimes do this too. Building on Foucault’s idea that power can be both positive and empowering or negative and dominating, Biddy Martin and Chandra Mohanty suggest that fighting oppression involves seeing power in a way that refuses totalizing visions of it and can therefore account for the possibility of resistance, as in creating something new, within existing power relations (Martin and Mohanty 2003: 104). Suggesting that representation only ever brings people into power therefore means rejecting a vast range of moments when the oppressed have voiced their refusal to be reduced to non-beings outside of politics (Sharma 2009: 475). In other words, resistance is not only or always a reaction to the constraining effects of dominating power, but can also express power as something positive and liberating. From the Black Panthers to the Sans Papiers, demands for representation, when carried out by minority groups for themselves, can challenge the role of dominant power over that group and create new, emancipated subjectivities (Goldberg 1996; Malik 1996). Depending on who it is that acts, then, in some cases demands for recognition/rights can be a radical and transformative political act (Nyers 2015. See also Butler and Spivak 2007; Isin 2008; Nyers and Rygiel 2012). As Nandita Sharma suggests, in response to Papadopoulos et al.’s book Escape Routes, ¶ we must recognise that making life and fashioning our subjectivities are intimately intertwined and making ‘new social bodies’ … is not the same as bringing people back into power through identity politics (or identity policing). It is important to recognise that there are significant qualitative differences between subjectivities. There are those that Papadopoulos et al. rightly discuss as bringing us directly back into power – and which account for most of the subjectivities that people hold today (‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘heterosexual’, ‘homosexual’, ‘native’ and so on) – but there are also those that are born of practices of escape. (Sharma 2009: 473, emphasis in original)

### 2AC---AT: Alt

#### The alt results in totalitarianism

Dean Richard **Villa**, Political Theory – UC Santa Barbara, **‘96**

(*Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political*, p. 246-7)

Arendt appropriates Heidegger’s genealogy of the technical sense of action in order to highlight the tradition’s persistent attempt to overcome plurality, the politically most relevant expression of the finitude of the human condition. Subjecting *praxis* to the rule of an end-representing reason makes it possible to exchange the nonsovereign freedom of **plural political actors** for the **command** **and** **control** exercised by the artisan. The Platonic “translation” of acting into the idiom of making established the pattern for deriving action from first philosophy or theory, a pattern that offered an escape from the irreducible relativity which besets the realm of human affairs. The substitution of making for acting initiates a paradigm of correspondence that, as Lyotard notes, delimits the Western tradition of political philosophy. Within the tropological space opened by this substitution, politics is viewed as the means or techné by which “the ‘fashioning’ of **a people according to the** idea or **ideal** of just being-together” is accomplished.27 So long as political philosophy sees its task as the articulation of first principles with which actions, peoples, and institutions must be brought into accord, it reiterates the Platonic schema; moreover, it perpetuates the idea that politics resembles a plastic art. Arendt’s critique of the “Platonic” tradition reveals the drive to conflate political and artistic categories at the core of Western political theory, underlining the stubborn persistence of the state as artwork/politics as *techné* tropes. The strength of these figures is measured by the fact that the closure of the tradition barely shakes the logic of justification institutionalized by the Platonic separation of theory and practice. Western political theory, as Schürmann points out, has always demanded that action be grounded in some extrapolitical first (the cosmic order, natural or divine hierarchy, Reason and natural right, History, the greatest good for the greatest number, the emancipatory interest of the discursive community).28 As a result, it never really abandons the view that politics is a kind of **plastic art**, the “fashioning,” more or less **violent**, of a people in conformity with an ideal. The persistence of this trope is explained by its **efficacy for** **reducing plurality and difference**, and by its ability to represent violence and coercive power as “right.”29 Arendt’s theory of nonsovereign, agonistic action smashes this figure, breaking the circuit of justification through the liberation of action from the rule of grounding principles and pregiven ends.30 The essentially normative function of political theory – that is, the theoretical specification of the conditions for the legitimate exercise of power – is suspended.31 In its place Arendt develops a phenomenology of action and a narrative approach to the closure of the public realm in modernity, an approach designed to keep the memory of an agonistic public sphere alive. With this bracketing of the legitimation problematic, a new appreciation of spaces and practices not typically viewed as political becomes possible.32 Moreover, the Arendtian liberation of action throws the antipolitical, not to say the *inhuman*, consequences of the tradition’s conflation of artistic and political categories into sharp relief. The teleocratic concept of action may be seen as the primary and most enduring expression of this conflation. With the collapse of transcendental grounds for the political, the logic of correspondence and justification built into this concept turns inward. The result is that the fashioning or “fictioning” of the community in conformity with an ideal of Justice is transformed into an exercise in self-production.33 And with this transformation, the threshold of modernity is traced. We can see this transformation at work in the emergence of the Hobbesian problematic: the construction of the “Leviathan” needed to overawe its subjects is the work of those very subjects, in their “natural,” presubjected, and radically dissociated state.14 The example of Hobbes clearly demonstrates how, once the “art” of politics is deprived of its natural ground (once *techné* can no longer be seen as the completion or accomplishment of *physis*), a paradoxical and impossible logic asserts itself. The conundrum is simply put: the people, who do not yet exist *as a people*, must somehow always already be enough of a subject in order to author or fashion themselves *qua* community. The answers to this riddle proposed by the social contract tradition – Hobbes’s pact of association, which is simultaneously a transfer of power to a designated sovereign; Locke’s presupposition of what Laslett has called “natural political virtue”; the Rousseauian mechanism of the total alienation of individual rights and powers by which a communal, sovereign power is formed – have all been unconvincing, to say the least.35 Romanticism can be seen as the attempt to escape this paradox by radicalizing it. Instituting what Jean-Luc nancy has called an “immanentist” logic of communal self-formation, romanticism elides the distinction between process and end: the subject is redefined as work in the double sense of self-formative activity *and* product.36 As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe notes, in the romantic vision the community at work creates and works *itself*, thereby accomplishing the “subjective process *par excellence*, the process of self-formation and self-production.”37 The aim of the community of beings becomes “in essence to produce their own essence as community.”38 With this move, a peculiarly *modern* version of the traditional conflation of art and politics is created. The *organicity* of the political, origincally laid down by Plato’s *Republic*, takes a new and extreme form: the figure of the subject who is simultaneously artist *and* work absorbs that of the aesthetically integrated state. This subjectivization of the state as artwork trope culminates in the **totalitarian** **will** **to self-effectuation**: the will to the self-creation of a people characterized by full actualization, complete self-presence.39 The only community capable of achieving such self-presence is one from which plurality, difference, mediation, and alienation have been **expunged**: a community, in other words, that is not a *political* community at all.

# 1AR

## Adv---Crisis

#### Transition goes nuclear

Mann 14 [Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>]

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

## K

### 1AR---Perm---Theory

#### Quote from the 2NC “alliances with the Black Panther” while describing alt solvency---they failed at autonomy and improved through demands for political recognition---proves both perm and alt fails points

King, 16—has been active in campaigning for refugee rights and against border controls for over a decade, has taught at the University of Nottingham and worked as a caseworker with the British Refugee Council (Natasha, *No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance* pg 39-42, dml)

But to what extent are these experiments in autonomy ever entirely autonomous? In response to Richard Day’s book on the newest social movements, Richard Thompson argues that it’s unrealistic to talk about creating wholly autonomous social structures because ‘[t]he second they’re consequential is the second they’ll be noticed [by the state]. At that point, it becomes impossible to break the cycle of antagonism by will alone. They will come after us’ (Thompson n.d., emphasis added). In other words, experiments in autonomy are rarely (if ever) entirely free from a relation to the state, or from state antagonism, and we are rarely able to ignore that antagonism. We mayantagonize the state, but we are forced also to respond to the state, as a form of self-defence. This has happened time and time again, from the steady illegalization of squatting in Europe, and the tightening of laws around private property, to the infiltration by the CIA of the Black Panther movement, to the struggle between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state. We see this in the struggle for the freedom of movement when, continuing with the examples above, the EU employs Frontex special missions on the Turkish/Greek borders, or when the living spaces of people without papers are raided or destroyed.¶ Whether people have been forced to, or they have seen it as the best strategy, the history of struggles for liberation has been one that included demands on the state. Often this has taken the form of engagement in a politics of rights and/or recognition. 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Rights claims, for example, have been seen as essentially reinforcing the role of the state as the benefactor and grantor of rights, and reinforcing the notion that rights represent entitlements applicable to those who fit certain descriptions of being a human (cf. Arendt 1973 [1951]; Barbagallo and Beuret 2008; Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010; Elam 1994). From this perspective, demands for rights and representation amount to disputes over the allocation of equality and therefore can only ever achieve a redistribution of that equality, rather than undermining the idea that equality is somehow qualified in the first place. As Imogen Tyler says, ‘[c]itizenship is a famously exclusionary concept, and its exclusionary force is there by design. The exclusions of citizenship are immanent to its logic, and not at all accidental. Citizenship is meant to produce successful and unsuccessful subjects. Citizenship, in other words, is “designed to fail”’ (Tyler, quoted in Nyers 2015: 31). ¶ Similar variations of this critique have appeared in the autonomy of migration debate. Representation can also be thought of as a bordering technology that seeks to pacify and discipline expressions of autonomy (or attempts at escape) (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). In other words, the politics of citizenship is problematic because it only ever brings people into the state. ‘Of course migrants become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights, but the demands of migrants and the dynamics of migration cannot be exhausted in the quest for visibility and rights’ (ibid.: 219).¶ I have a lot of sympathy with these arguments, and because of them am extremely suspicious of a politics of citizenship. But when it comes to actual practices of struggle against the border, a resolute stand against such strategies seems naïve, and insulting to those who have taken part. Migrant-led struggles have often been claims for rights, and ultimately I don’t want to dismiss such practices because they are philosophically problematic. In fact, sometimes to appeal to rights or recognition is the only available strategy in situations of extreme vulnerability, where people’s options are highly limited. Recognizing that we are in relations of power right now means also recognizing that our situation is imperfect and that we have to struggle in our (imperfect) reality. Youssef, a long-time activist for the freedom of movement in Greece, himself of North African descent, talked about the need for pragmatism in tactics; that sometimes we must engage with the state in order to bring about greater freedoms now. ‘Today, in Creta, in Chania, they will catch five people. How can I take them from the jail? I have something in the police station, OK. I have to talk with them today. OK? But tomorrow I can fuck him. He’s not my friend. He’s not my comrade. OK. We are talking today. Tomorrow we are fucking’ (interview, Youssef). His statement reflects how many practices that refuse the border often come out of necessity. In other words they’re rarely part of some intentional or ‘noble’ act to become a rights-bearer, say, and more often pragmatic decisions based on the need to alleviate immediate situations of oppression. ¶ A no borders politics seeks to go beyond claims to representation and rights that ultimately stand to reinforce the state. But claims to representation and rights can sometimes do this too. Building on Foucault’s idea that power can be both positive and empowering or negative and dominating, Biddy Martin and Chandra Mohanty suggest that fighting oppression involves seeing power in a way that refuses totalizing visions of it and can therefore account for the possibility of resistance, as in creating something new, within existing power relations (Martin and Mohanty 2003: 104). Suggesting that representation only ever brings people into power therefore means rejecting a vast range of moments when the oppressed have voiced their refusal to be reduced to non-beings outside of politics (Sharma 2009: 475). In other words, resistance is not only or always a reaction to the constraining effects of dominating power, but can also express power as something positive and liberating. From the Black Panthers to the Sans Papiers, demands for representation, when carried out by minority groups for themselves, can challenge the role of dominant power over that group and create new, emancipated subjectivities (Goldberg 1996; Malik 1996). Depending on who it is that acts, then, in some cases demands for recognition/rights can be a radical and transformative political act (Nyers 2015. See also Butler and Spivak 2007; Isin 2008; Nyers and Rygiel 2012). As Nandita Sharma suggests, in response to Papadopoulos et al.’s book Escape Routes, ¶ we must recognise that making life and fashioning our subjectivities are intimately intertwined and making ‘new social bodies’ … is not the same as bringing people back into power through identity politics (or identity policing). It is important to recognise that there are significant qualitative differences between subjectivities. There are those that Papadopoulos et al. rightly discuss as bringing us directly back into power – and which account for most of the subjectivities that people hold today (‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘heterosexual’, ‘homosexual’, ‘native’ and so on) – but there are also those that are born of practices of escape. (Sharma 2009: 473, emphasis in original)

### 1AR---AT: Nationalism Link

#### The aff solves quality of life without needing exploitation---the alt

Alexander 14 - acclaimed political commentator whose work is regularly praised by top academics (Scott, <https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/24/book-review-red-plenty/>, emuse)

There’s a very settled modern explanation of the conflict between capitalism and communism. Capitalism is good at growing the economy and making countries rich. Communism is good at caring for the poor and promoting equality. So your choice between capitalism and communism is a trade-off between those two things. But for at least the first fifty years of the Cold War, the Soviets would not have come close to granting you that these are the premises on which the battle must be fought. They were officially quite certain that any day now Communism was going to prove itself better at economic growth, better at making people rich quickly, than capitalism. Even unofficially, most of their leaders and economists were pretty certain of it. And for a little while, even their capitalist enemies secretly worried they were right. The arguments are easy to understand. Under capitalism, plutocrats use the profits of industry to buy giant yachts for themselves. Under communism, the profits can be reinvested back into the industry to build more factories or to make production more efficient, increasing growth rate. Under capitalism, everyone is competing with each other, and much of your budget is spent on zero-sum games like advertising and marketing and sales to give you a leg up over your competition. Under communism, there is no need to play these zero-sum games and that part of the budget can be reinvested to grow the industry more quickly. Under capitalism, everyone is working against everyone else. If Ford discovers a clever new car-manufacturing technique, their first impulse is to patent it so GM can’t use it, and GM’s first impulse is to hire thousands of lawyers to try to thwart that attempt. Under communism, everyone is working together, so if one car-manufacturing collective discovers a new technique they send their blueprints to all the other car-manufacturing collectives in order to help them out. So in capitalism, each company will possess a few individual advances, but under communism every collective will have every advance, and so be more productive. These arguments make a lot of sense to me, and they definitely made sense to the Communists of the first half of the 20th century. As a result, they were confident of overtaking capitalism. They realized that they’d started with a [disadvantage] – czarist Russia had been dirt poor and almost without an industrial base – and that they’d faced a further [disadvantage] in having the Nazis burn half their country during World War II – but they figured as soon as they overcame these [disadvantages] their natural advantages would let them leap ahead of the West in only a couple of decades. The great Russian advances of the 50s – Sputnik, Gagarin, etc – were seen as evidence that this was already starting to come true in certain fields. And then it all went wrong. II. Grant that communism really does have the above advantages over capitalism. What advantage does capitalism have? The classic answer is that during communism no one wants to work hard. They do as little as they can get away with, then slack off because they don’t reap the rewards of their own labor. Red Plenty doesn’t really have theses. In fact, it’s not really a non-fiction work at all. It’s a dramatized series of episodes in the lives of Russian workers, politicians, and academics, intended to come together to paint a picture of how the Soviet economy worked. But if I can impose a thesis upon the text, I don’t think it agreed with this. In certain cases, Russians were very well-incentivized by things like “We will kill you unless you meet the production target”. Later, when the state became less murder-happy, the threat of death faded to threats of demotions, ruined careers, and transfer to backwater provinces. And there were equal incentives, in the form of promotion or transfer to a desirable location such as Moscow, for overperformance. There were even monetary bonuses, although money bought a lot less than it did in capitalist countries and was universally considered inferior to status in terms of purchasing power. Yes, there were [Goodhart’s Law](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law) type issues going on – if you’re being judged per product, better produce ten million defective products than 9,999,999 excellent products – but that wasn’t the crux of the problem. Red Plenty presented the problem with the Soviet economy primarily as one of allocation. You could have a perfectly good factory that could be producing lots of useful things if only you had one extra eensy-weensy part, but unless the higher-ups had allocated you that part, you were out of luck. If that part happened to break, getting a new one would depend on how much clout you (and your superiors) pulled versus how much clout other people who wanted parts (and their superiors) held. The book illustrated this reality with a series of stories (I’m not sure how many of these were true, versus useful dramatizations). In one, a pig farmer in Siberia needed wood in order to build sties for his pigs so they wouldn’t freeze – if they froze, he would fail to meet his production target and his career would be ruined. The government, which mostly dealt with pig farming in more temperate areas, hadn’t accounted for this and so hadn’t allocated him any wood, and he didn’t have enough clout with officials to request some. A factory nearby had extra wood they weren’t using and were going to burn because it was too much trouble to figure out how to get it back to the government for re-allocation. The farmer bought the wood from the factory in an under-the-table deal. He was caught, which usually wouldn’t have been a problem because everybody did this sort of thing and it was kind of the “smoking marijuana while white” of Soviet offenses. But at that particular moment the Party higher-ups in the area wanted to make an example of someone in order to look like they were on top of their game to their higher-ups. The pig farmer was sentenced to years of hard labor. A tire factory had been assigned a tire-making machine that could make 100,000 tires a year, but the government had gotten confused and assigned them a production quota of 150,000 tires a year. The factory leaders were stuck, because if they tried to correct the government they would look like they were challenging their superiors and get in trouble, but if they failed to meet the impossible quota, they would all get demoted and their careers would come to an end. They learned that the tire-making-machine-making company had recently invented a new model that really could make 150,000 tires a year. In the spirit of [Chen Sheng](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dazexiang_Uprising), they decided that since the penalty for missing their quota was something terrible and the penalty for sabotage was also something terrible, they might as well take their chances and destroy their own machinery in the hopes the government sent them the new improved machine as a replacement. To their delight, the government believed their story about an “accident” and allotted them a new tire-making machine. However, the tire-making-machine-making company had decided to cancel production of their new model. You see, the new model, although more powerful, weighed less than the old machine, and the government was measuring their production by kilogram of machine. So it was easier for them to just continue making the old less powerful machine. The tire factory was allocated another machine that could only make 100,000 tires a year and was back in the same quandary they’d started with. It’s easy to see how all of these problems could have been solved (or would never have come up) in a capitalist economy, with its use of prices set by supply and demand as an allocation mechanism. And it’s easy to see how thoroughly the Soviet economy was sabotaging itself by avoiding such prices. III. The “hero” of Red Plenty – although most of the vignettes didn’t involve him directly – was Leonid Kantorovich, a Soviet mathematician who thought he could solve the problem. He invented the technique of [linear programming](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_programming), a method of solving optimization problems perfectly suited to allocating resources throughout an economy. He immediately realized its potential and wrote a nice letter to Stalin politely suggesting his current method of doing economics was wrong and he could do better – this during a time when everyone else in Russia was desperately trying to avoid having Stalin notice them because he tended to kill anyone he noticed. Luckily the letter was intercepted by a kindly mid-level official, who kept it away from Stalin and warehoused Kantorovich in a university somewhere. During the “Khruschev thaw”, Kantorovich started getting some more politically adept followers, the higher-ups started taking note, and there was a real movement to get his ideas implemented. A few industries were run on Kantorovichian principles as a test case and seemed to do pretty well. There was an inevitable backlash. Opponents accused the linear programmers of being capitalists-in-disguise, which wasn’t helped by their use of something called “shadow prices”. But the combination of their own political adeptness and some high-level support from Khruschev – who alone of all the Soviet leaders seemed to really believe in his own cause and be a pretty okay guy – put them within arm’s reach of getting their plans implemented. But when elements of linear programming were adopted, they were adopted piecemeal and toothless. The book places the blame on Alexei Kosygen, who implemented [a bunch of economic reforms that failed](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Soviet_economic_reform), in a chapter that makes it clear exactly how constrained the Soviet leadership really was. You hear about Stalin, you imagine these guys having total power, but in reality they walked a narrow line, and all these “shadow prices” required more political capital than they were willing to mobilize, even when they thought Kantorovich might have a point. IV. In the end, I was left with two contradictory impressions from the book. First, amazement that the Soviet economy got as far as it did, given how incredibly screwed up it was. You hear about how many stupid things were going on at every level, and you think: This was the country that built Sputnik and Mir? This was the country that almost buried us beneath the tide of history? It is a credit to the Russian people that they were able to build so much as a screwdriver in such conditions, let alone a space station. But second, a sense of what could have been. What if Stalin hadn’t murdered most of the competent people? What if entire fields of science hadn’t been banned for silly reasons? What if Kantorovich had been able to make the Soviet leadership base its economic planning around linear programming? How might history have turned out differently? One of the book’s most frequently-hammered-in points was that there was was a brief moment, back during the 1950s, when everything seemed to be going right for Russia. Its year-on-year GDP growth (as estimated by impartial outside observers) was somewhere between 7 to 10%. Starvation was going down. Luxuries were going up. Kantorovich was fixing entire industries with his linear programming methods. Then Khruschev made a serious of crazy loose cannon decisions, he was ousted by Brezhnev, Kantorovich was pushed aside and ignored, the “Khruschev thaw” was reversed and tightened up again, and everything stagnated for the next twenty years. If Khruschev had stuck around, if Kantorovich had succeeded, might the common knowledge that Communism is terrible at producing material prosperity look a little different? The book very briefly mentioned a competing theory of resource allocation promoted by Victor Glushkov, a cyberneticist in Ukraine. He thought he could use computers – then a very new technology – to calculate optimal allocation for everyone. He failed to navigate the political seas as adroitly as Kantorovich’s faction, and the killing blow was a paper that pointed out that for him to do everything really correctly would take a hundred million years of computing time. That was in 1960. If computing power doubles every two years, we’ve undergone about 25 doubling times since then, suggesting that we ought to be able to perform Glushkov’s calculations in three years – or three days, if we give him a lab of three hundred sixty five computers to work with. There could have been this entire field of centralized economic planning. Maybe it would have continued to underperform prices. Or maybe after decades of trial and error across the entire Soviet Union, it could have caught up. We’ll never know. Glushkov and Kantorovich were marginalized and left to play around with toy problems until their deaths in the 80s, and as far as I know their ideas were never developed further in the context of a national planned economy. V. One of the ways people like insulting smart people, or rational people, or scientists, is by telling them they’re the type of people who are attracted to Communism. “Oh, you think you can control and understand everything, just like the Communists did.” And I had always thought this was a pretty awful insult. The people I know who most identify as rationalists, or scientifically/technically minded, are also most likely to be libertarian. So there, case dismissed, everybody go home. This book was the first time that I, as a person who considers himself rationally/technically minded, realized that I was super attracted to Communism. Here were people who had a clear view of the problems of human civilization – all the greed, all the waste, all the zero-sum games. Who had the entire population united around a vision of a better future, whose backers could direct the entire state to better serve the goal. All they needed was to solve the engineering challenges, to solve the equations, and there they were, at the golden future. And they were smart enough to be worthy of the problem – Glushkov invented cybernetics, Kantorovich won a Nobel Prize in Economics. And in the end, they never got the chance. There’s an interpretation of Communism as a refutation of social science, here were these people who probably knew some social science, but did it help them run a state, no it didn’t. But from the little I learned about Soviet history from this book, this seems diametrically wrong. The Soviets had practically no social science. They hated social science. You would think they would at least have some good Marxists, but apparently Stalin killed all of them just in case they might come up with versions of Marxism he didn’t like, and in terms of a vibrant scholarly field it never recovered. Economics was tainted with its association with capitalism from the very beginning, and when it happened at all it was done by non-professionals. Kantorovich was a mathematician by training; Glushkov a computer scientist. Soviet Communism isn’t what happens when you let nerds run a country, it’s what happens when you kill all the nerds who are experts in country-running, bring in nerds from unrelated fields to replace them, then make nice noises at those nerds in principle while completely ignoring them in practice. Also, you ban all Jews from positions of importance, because fuck you.

### 1AR---AT: UQ Trick

#### Existence of movements and revolutions will not get rid of the nation state or imperialism

Rodrik, Prof. of Economics, 12 (Dani Rodrik, Prof. in Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard, “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography— Who Needs the Nation-State?” *Economic Geography*, 89(1): 1-19)

Yet the nation-state refuses to wither away. It has proved remarkably resilient and remains the main determinant of the global distribution of income, the primary locus of market-supporting institutions, and the chief repository of personal attachments and affiliations. Consider a few facts. To test my students’ intuition about the determinants of global inequality, I ask them on the first day of class whether they would rather be rich in a poor country or poor in a rich country. I tell them to consider only their own consumption level and to think of rich and poor as referring to the top and bottom 10 percent of a country’s income distribution. A rich country, in turn, is one in the top decile of the intercountry distribution of per capita incomes, while a poor country is one in the bottom. Armed with this background, typically a majority of the students respond that they would rather be rich in a poor country. They are in fact massively wrong. Defined the way I just did, the poor in a rich country are more than three times richer than the rich in a poor country (Rodrik 2011, chap. 7). The optical illusion that leads the students astray is that the superrich with the BMWs and gated mansions they have seen in poor countries are a miniscule proportion of the population—significantly fewer than the top 10 percent I asked them to focus on. By the time we consider the average of the top decile as a whole, we have taken a huge leap down the income scale. The students have just discovered a telling feature of the world economy: our economic fortunes are determined primarily by where (which country) we are born and only secondarily by our location on the income-distribution scale. Or to put it in more technical but also more accurate terms, most of global inequality is accounted for by inequality across rather than within nations (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002). So much for globalization having revoked the relevance of national borders. Second, consider the role of national identity. One may imagine that attachments to the nation-state have worn thin between the push of transnational affinities, on the one hand, and the pull of local connections, on the other hand. But this does not seem to be the case. National identity remains alive and well, even in some surprising corners of the world. To see the strength of national identity, let us turn to the 2004–8 round of the World Values Survey, which covered about 83,000 individuals in 57 countries (http:// www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). The respondents to the survey were asked a range of questions about the strength of their local, national, and global attachments. I measured the strength of national attachments by computing the percentages of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement “I see myself as a citizen of [country, nation].” I measured the strength of global attachments, in turn, by the percentages of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement “I see myself as a world citizen.” In each case, I subtracted these percentages from analogous percentages for “I see myself as a member of my local community” to provide for some kind of normalization. In other words, I measured national and global attachments relative to local attachments. Figure 1 shows the results for the entire global sample, as well as for the United States, the European Union, China, and India individually. What stands out is not so much that national identity is vastly stronger than identity as a “global citizen” —that much was predictable. The surprising finding is how it apparently exerts a stronger pull than membership in the local community, as can be observed in the positive percentages for normalized national identity. This tendency is true across the board and the strongest in the United States and India, two vast countries where we may have expected local attachments to be, if anything, stronger than attachment to the nation-state. I find it also striking that European citizens feel so little attachment to the European Union. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, the idea of citizenship in the European Union seems as remote to Europeans as that of global citizenship, despite long decades of European integration and institution building. It bears saying that these survey results pertain to the period before the present crisis. One can safely guess that European attachments have worn even thinner since 2008.

### 1AR---AT: Chemical Weapons

#### Sophistication is overstated, countermeasures solves---obviously can’t take down full decentralized US military

Jefferson et al. 14 – All authors involved in Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine, King’s College London, informed by participation in expert committees and working groups, and public debates organized by scientific organizations. Catherine Jefferson, involved in discussions on bioweapons, biosecurity and arms control for a decade, Filippa Lentzos, engaged in the field of synthetic biology for the last 7 years, and Claire Marris, attending and participating in a wide range of scientific and policy events on synthetic biology for 5 years. [Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: Challenging the “Myths”, 8-1-2014, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115/full]//BPS

Challenges to Myth 2 The link between synthetic biology and DIYbio, and the level of sophistication of the experiments typically being performed in DIYbio community labs, is overstated (24, 29). Members of DIYbio communities who are involved in more sophisticated experiments tend to be trained biologists, not amateurs and, as noted in the previous section, the experiences of amateur members of the DIYbio community demonstrate the challenges posed by tacit knowledge to successfully conduct even rudimentary biological experiments. Furthermore, members of the DIYbio community tend to be proactive in addressing and engaging with safety and security concerns and many community labs have strict rules about access (24). For example, BioCurious, a community lab in silicon Valley, requires all members working in the wet lab to undertake a safety orientation, regardless of formal education or previous laboratory experience. BioCurious also has a safety committee that reviews requests to work with organisms not already on an approved list, and can approve, modify, or reject experimental design4. DIYbio.org has also been active in promoting responsibility within the community. For example, in partnership with the Synthetic Biology Project at the Wilson Center, DIYbio.org has developed a Draft Code of Ethics that includes a focus on transparency, safety, and peaceful purpose5. In January 2013, DIYbio.org also launched an “Ask a Biosafety Officer” web portal6 in which anyone with a question can submit their query to a panel of volunteer biosafety experts. DIYbio Europe has established a set of Community Lab Safety Guidelines, with an emphasis on communication, openness, lab organization, and user and environmental safety (30). The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) weapons of mass destruction outreach program has also launched a series of efforts to promote outreach and oversight of the DIYbio community (31).